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Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the 
Member States’ militaries? 
Like a phoenix rising from the ashes, Europe emerged from World War Two as something 
akin to a new creation. Gone were the days of aggressive militarism and war, in its place 
would be civilian power and democracy; or so Europe hoped. The 20
th
 and 21
st
 Centuries 
have witnessed some of the most barbaric acts in human history; this barbarity has led 
Europe on a quest to form a truly integrated European defence force with which to bring 
peace and justice both within its own borders and also to the world. By utilising Jutta 
Weldes’ Constructivism framework, this thesis unravels and exposes the way in which the 
constructed identities of the European Union and its forbears have driven this quest in the 
post-war years; it also explores the interface between these identities and the EU’s 
relationship with NATO, the United States, and its own constituent Member States.   
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Conflict has been a constant companion to humanity since time began; wars and 
rumours of wars have impacted how the nations of the world have acted 
throughout the 20
th
 and 21
st
 Centuries. Europe has often been at the epicentre of 
some of the modern world’s most destructive wars; this dubious distinction was a 
fact of life for Europe for generations culminating in the most destructive war in 
history, World War Two. The defeat of the Axis powers laid the foundation for 
what would become the European Union. This new Europe strived to shed its old 
constructed identity built on militarism and nationalism and create in its place a 
new pan-European identity in which disputes would be settled through dialogue 
rather than at the point of a gun. However despite this sincere desire, conflict has 
remained a very tangible reality on the global scene and for our focus, in Europe. 
Despite the high hopes for a peaceful new millennium, the 21
st
 Century has been 
one mired in bloodshed and war; executions once thought lost in the dark ages of 
history, have vigorously returned with the crucifixions of Christians and other 
minorities in the Middle East; while sectarian tensions have left millions under 
constant threat in many parts of the world. It is in this context, that we explore the 
question “Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the 
integration of the Member States’ militaries?” 
In order to answer this question, the thesis will analyse three distinct areas which 
play a direct role on EU military integration; these three sections will in turn be 
analysed within the framework Weldes’ Constructivist theory. In Section One, 
three primary areas are explored; firstly, we will analyse contemporary security 
threats that are shaping the global security theatre. These security threats are the 
wider Middle East, Syria, Ukraine and the Asia-Pacific region. These theatres of 
conflict have been chosen as they not only have a direct impact on European 
security, but also on global security. The primary purpose of Section One 
therefore is to lay the foundation from which we can understand, within the 
context of contemporary realities, the actions and inactions of the EU, its desire to 
be a credible global actor, and its quest for an integrated military. 
The second section focuses on how the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) has impacted the drive towards European military integration. It is vital 
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to explore the way in which NATO has impacted every facet of European 
security in the post-war years; as we shall see, it is impossible to overestimate 
American influence. We will examine how the United States has provided 
important leadership to European military integration, while at the same engaging 
in divisive actions which resulted in a major European nation leaving NATO for 
many decades. In order to unpack the considerable role that NATO plays in 
European defence, we will explore the manner in which four NATO members 
undertake their commitments to NATO; these nations are Spain, UK, France and 
the US. These nations have been chosen as they represent a wide spectrum of 
capabilities within European defence from both sides of the Atlantic. This in-
depth analysis of the four nations provides the reader with a direct insight into 
these actors and is supplemented by a more widely scoped analysis of other 
NATO and EU member’s attitudes towards NATO.  
In addition, Section Two analyses how EU Member States have interacted with 
NATO through the lenses of the conflict in Libya. This analysis will highlight the 
shortcomings and divisions which plague both NATO and the EU and provide the 
reader with a real world view of how Europe’s attitude towards defence spending 
over many decades has led to a capabilities shortfall. Libya is also an important 
frame of reference because it clearly displays to the reader how the EU’s new 
foreign policy strategy following Lisbon would stack up in a real world crisis. 
Finally, this section explores how the Chicago and Welsh summits have driven 
both NATO and conversely European security integration strategies. 
The third section will explore how post-war Europe has moved progressively 
towards an integrated military; this section begins with the very first major 
integration strategy, the Pleven Plan, and exposes how the constructed identities 
of post-war Europe impacted this strategy. This section then moves on to analyse 
how, from the Pleven Plan onwards, we see the same constructed identities 
appearing throughout the literature and it examines how these identities have 
impacted Europe’s drive to be seen as a credible international security actor. This 
section will analyse in detail the Pleven Plan, Maastricht, Lisbon, EU 
Battlegroups and the St Malo Declaration. These areas have been chosen as they 
highlight the fact that the underpinning identities of the European continent 
compel its elites to seek for a credible integrated military; these areas also 
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conclusively show the unmistakable role that the US has played within Europe in 
addition to the ongoing and deeply rooted divisions that are found within the EU 
and its predecessors. Through access to EU Parliament resolutions taken directly 
from the source, we are permitted an insight into just how deep and dangerous 
these divisions are to the formation of a credible integrated military. 
Finally, this thesis will compile the information and conclusions that have been 
made throughout in order to analyse whether the EU can be a credible 
international security actor without the integration of the Member States’ 
militaries; this analysis will be conducted through the lens of Weldes’ 
Constructivism. Constructivism enables the researcher to unpack and analyse 
what is on the European elites ‘slates’ and the manner in which this informs and 
underpins their policy and strategic initiatives in order to enable us to effectively 
answer; Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the 
integration of the Member States’ militaries? 
Conflict: constant evolution. 
When one looks back on humanity’s history, there remains a noteworthy 
constant, that of armed conflict. History, tradition and myth are abounding with 
conflict; these conflicts range from sibling rivalry, such as in the biblical story of 
Cain and Abel, to the heroic narratives of David or Hercules in Western culture, 
and to heroes such as Gilgamesh in the East. Intertwined with these mythic heroic 
narratives that fill the pages of our past and fire our imaginations today, are the 
stories and records of historical battles from all parts of the world; whether it be 
an ancient Roman legion ambushed in Teutoburg Forest or the Maori Chieftain 
Hone Heke fighting the British in the New Zealand Land Wars of the 19
th
 
Century, armed conflict has been a constant companion to human civilisation. 
While this ‘companion’ status has remained constant in its partnership with 
humanity, armed conflict, like human society itself, is ever adapting; one merely 
needs to examine a history book to witness this adaptation. From the first 
intertribal conflicts involving rudimentary weapons, to the first professional 
militaries of Rome, to the Dark Ages of Feudal lords on horseback fighting for 
honour, and the subsequent ebbing and flowing of weapons and strategy 
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throughout history, armed conflict rarely maintains a constant state before it 
evolves.  
This observation is more keenly made in the contemporary world than throughout 
most of human history, with a few notable exceptions such as the introduction of 
gunpowder to the battlefield. While events in the past such as the introduction of 
the stirrup to the mounted warrior, or the crossbow, which enabled a poorly 
trained peasant to incapacitate the Medieval super-weapon, the knight, have 
revolutionised armed conflict, these revolutions were spread out over a 
considerably longer span of time than the changes we are witnessing today. When 
we analyse the last century of weapons development, we cannot but come away 
astounded at the speed of the development and the sheer scope of the expansion 
we have seen. An example of this can be witnessed in the usage of aircraft; in 
World War One, aircraft played a very limited role on the battlefield and were not 
seen as a vital element with which to gain victory. However by the Second World 
War, aircraft were seen as vital to domination over the enemy. The Battle of 
Britain was a forceful example of where the RAF successfully fought off the 
Luftwaffe, and subsequently the German war machine, to turn the tide of battle 
against the Nazis. Not only did aircraft play a crucial role in and of themselves, 
but the manner in which they changed the broad spectrum of conflict is of 
particular interest; because of the speed of aircraft and the large scale destruction 
of which they are capable, naval battles have been increasingly focussed on the 
usage of aircraft carriers and this has made the old style of naval warfare 
essentially obsolete.  From World War Two, into the Cold War, air forces would 
begin to be armed with the most destructive weapons known to humanity, nuclear 
weapons. The ability to travel vast distances in a short amount of time with 
destructive ability led in part to a new form of conflict doctrine, Mutually 
Assured Destruction (MAD). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent end of MAD, aircraft again evolved to better meet the operational 
demands of a post-Cold War world and thus was born the age of the drones. 
This extremely brief overview of just one aspect of the evolution of conflict, the 
role of aircraft in war and its subsequent impact on armed conflict, is important to 
the central question of this thesis, ‘Can the EU be a credible international 
security actor without the integration of the Member States’ militaries?’  
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The factor of evolution and change is a crucial one because future military 
integration may be neither familiar nor recognisable to the public, to politicians, 
to decision makers or to other stakeholders. This potential unpredictability 
however will not be driven by weapon development alone; while weapon 
development is important, its evolution is itself driven by the realities of specific 
theatres of conflict that condition and shape both local actors and these actors’ 
defence paradigms.  
Contemporary Europe is undergoing a major shift in its geostrategic outlook; 
security threats are no longer occurring far from its borders but are once again, 
and increasingly, occurring within the ‘European Neighbourhood’. The following 
section will explore how events in Eastern Europe, Middle East and North Africa 
are influencing the EU’s security. The conclusion of this section briefly spotlights 
other regions of the globe that also affect the EU’s security directly, despite their 
geographic location, in particular the Asia- Pacific region. 
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DEFINITIONS. 
Before we proceed any further it is important to first define the terms within this 
thesis.  
European Union (EU). 
While this may appear to be self-explanatory, it is important to clarify how the 
phrase ‘EU’ is used in this thesis. Within this context, the term is used to refer to any 
action undertaken by the EU itself and never to an action undertaken by a Member 
State or group of Member States acting outside of an EU mission; for example, the 
actions of France in Mali do not qualify as an EU operation due to the fact that the 
French military presence there is acting under the leadership of the French 
Government and is taking place outside EU superintendence. In other words, in 
order to be designated as an EU operation, the said operation must be led by an EU 
appointed command structure operating under direct EU control. 
Credible. 
According to the Collins English Dictionary the meaning of ‘credible’ is, "capable of 
being believed (and) trustworthy".
1
Thus, the term is used in this context to explore 
whether or not the EU is viewed by the international community as being able to 
successfully or effectively operate in a given security environment. 
International Security. 
This is perhaps the most important and complex concept to define; International 
Security (IS) is a vast and multifaceted field needing an extensive analysis outside 
the scope of this thesis. It is a very broad topic with interwoven strands from various 
issues which all influence one another. For example, a drought in the American mid-
West can pose a major security challenge to nations in Africa due to rising food 
prices and the consequent impact this has on public order. As International Security 
is inherently volatile, its constituent elements are in a constant state of flux; for 
example, during the early post-war period, IS was largely driven by the MAD 
doctrine and thus issues such as Climate Change were of secondary importance. 
                                                          
1 Collins. Collins English Dictionary Third Edition. Wrotham: Market House Books, 1992. 
 
James Comery 51033920 
 
11 
 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the concept of IS changed to meet the 
new realities of security in the 1990s. When the Twin Towers were attacked, a new 
era of IS was actuated; international terrorism was now identified to be the major 
concern and has subsequently driven the way in which the world views IS in a 
radical new direction. However with the re-emergence of inter-state conflict in 
multiple theatres around the globe, we are witnessing once again a further turn in 
what can be considered IS; note that this new direction of IS will be explored in 
greater detail following the Literature Review.    
The fact that IS is so volatile means that there is no international scholarly or 
political consensus on how to define it or even what constitutes security. For 
example Wolfers states that national security is an "ambiguous symbol . . . (which) 
leaves room for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can 
afford (and therefore) suffers from the absence of a common understanding of what 
security is, how it can be conceptualized, and what its most relevant research 
questions are."
2
 In contrast to this view, Garnett argues that the concept of security 
was so overdeveloped that it is "so wide in its scope that it is in danger of being 
emptied of meaning."
3
These two statements illustrate the divergence of the 
arguments surrounding security; Schultze summarises the variance in this way: 
"The concept of national security does not lend itself to neat and precise 
formulation. It deals with a wide variety of risks about whose probabilities we 
have little knowledge and of contingencies whose nature we can only dimply 
perceive".
4
 
Despite this challenging reality, it is important to ground this thesis in a coherent 
definition of what constitutes IS and as the subject is one that focuses on military 
integration, the author has utilised a somewhat traditional definition to security. Walt 
defines security as "the study of the threat, use and control of military force”, 
especially of “the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, 
or engage in war.”5 It is important to note that while Walt emphasises military power 
                                                          
2
 Covenant University. “Media uses and Effects”. Covenant University. April 2014. 
http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/3806/1/Dr.%20Jide%20Ibietan%206.pdf (accessed July 15, 2014). 
3
 Ibid  
4
 Ibid 
5
 Ibid 
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he does concede that this is not the only source of power or the only way to exercise 
it.  
METHODOLOGY. 
This paper employs qualitative methodology to examine the question, "Can the EU 
be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member 
States’ militaries"? The exclusion of quantitative analysis is justified due to the 
focus of this paper, which is the ability of Europe to act as a credible international 
security actor; the inclusion of quantitative research methods would be of little 
relevance as the current integration of Europe's armed forces is effectively only 
existent on paper. Using a quantitative approach to examine an abstract topic such as 
constructed or competing national identities, needs and ambitions, will not only fail 
to offer any definitive insights, but in fact may lead the researcher to false 
conclusions as the subtleties of constructed national or regional identities are seldom 
expressed in measurable ways. 
Qualitative research can be understood as a research strategy that usually 
foregrounds words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data. 
Human behaviours and identities are not always based on what can be measured, 
hence the limitations of the quantitative framework. Qualitative methodology allows 
us to analyse why and how a culture or nation has constructed its identity and the 
implications that this identity has on its actions. Sandelowski expands on this, 
“qualitative research is an umbrella term for an array of attitudes towards and 
strategies for conducting inquiry that are aimed at discovering how human beings 
understand, experience, interpret, and produce the social world”.6 This definition of 
qualitative methodology highlights the strengths and compatibilities of the research 
technique with both the research question of this report and the theoretical 
framework within which the data is analysed.  
Jutta Weldes’ Constructivism has been used to analyse the research data from a 
theoretical perspective. This theory enables the researcher to analyse collected data 
                                                          
6 Sandelowski, M. Qualitative Research: The Sage Encyclopaedia of Social Science Research Methods. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage, 2004. 
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through a theoretical lens that has been developed by an internationally acclaimed 
academic whose primary purpose is the analysis of constructed identities using 
qualitative methodology. Weldes’ Constructivism is a particularly insightful tool 
with which to probe the complex interface between European security needs, the 
proposed integration of European Member States’ militaries, and the multiple and 
conflicting national and pan-European identities. 
When using a qualitative technique in research, it is imperative to ensure that the 
collected data is interpreted correctly and is of an authoritative and relevant nature. 
While quantitative research has a substantial numerical focus, and is thus more 
straightforward in its approach, qualitative research is more interested in the 
subtleties of the data. When analysing the data for this research, the author has 
focussed heavily on primary resources such as treaties at both the European and 
Member State level; these include treaties such as the Maastricht and Lisbon and 
also the St Malo Treaty and Petersburg Tasks. The primary data is not just limited to 
public treaties but also includes resolutions and comments made within the 
European Parliament in Brussels; this information was obtained as a result of my 
employment as a Parliamentary Assistant in 2014-2015. This ability to utilise 
primary data directly from the European Union Plenary allowed the author a greater 
insight into the structures of the Union and their quest for a security union. 
While primary data is essential to any research, secondary data is often just as vital 
as it allows the author to access the research of others to gain a deeper understanding 
of and insight into what the primary data is stating. The data from primary sources is 
supplemented by secondary works from authoritative authors who provide a broad 
framework within which to understand and explore the primary data. These 
secondary sources originate from a wide range of topics and disciplines which do 
not necessarily have a primary focus on defence; this thesis has used secondary 
sources that discuss topics as diverse, yet interconnected, as climate and migration, 
as well as those with a more direct link to the thesis. This has been done so that the 
arguments made are of a robust nature and speak for the very diverse and 
multifaceted nature of contemporary security. Additionally, it is to be understood 
that the usage of secondary resources is vital and advantageous due to the fact that 
disinformation is an inescapable feature of government documents and statements. 
This situation may be due either to deliberate attempts to paint a greater picture of a 
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government or regime to the globe, or it may be employed to deliberately misled and 
hide the purpose of a strategy. Thus the use of secondary sources allows the author 
to analyse what experts have stated about any primary source and thus gain a 
valuable insight into whether or not a primary source is in fact dis-information. 
While it is intended that this dual approach will effectively confine the potential 
limitations of data collection, it is timely to recall that in any qualitative analysis of 
constructed identities, the researcher faces a number of latent constraints. As 
outlined above, these constraints can involve the act of dis-information; however, 
this not the only constraint. With a Union as vast and multicultural as the EU, 
inevitably the author will encounter literature from a non-English language source; 
this reality means that primary data may in fact be an inaccurate or impaired 
translation in regards to, for example, cultural nuances and idiom, or in that 
particular phrases and subtleties have been lost in translation and in this way have 
limited or misled the researcher. While this can weaken aspects of an argument 
taken from a single source, the overall problem can be mitigated through the usage 
of multiple sources, both primary and secondary, on a certain issue.   
THEORY. 
Weldes argues that “national interests are social constructions created as meaningful 
objects out of the intersubjective and culturally established meanings with which the 
world . . . and the place of the state in it is understood”.7 To expand, national 
interests, from Weldes’ perspective, are not necessarily based on fact but rather on 
the shared meanings and understandings that state officials place on both historical 
and contemporary events; while linguistic resources are understood as being utilised 
to construct national identities. Each of these events and linguistic resources is then 
“simultaneously given an identity; . . . with characteristics which are sometimes 
precise and certain, at other times vague and unsettled . . . their importance lies not 
in their accuracy, but in their provision of warranting conditions which make a 
particular action or belief more justified”.8 This statement by Weldes reinforces the 
central argument of Constructivism, which is uninterested in whether or not a 
position or identity is in fact based on objective, verifiable evidence. In 
                                                          
7
 Weldes, Jutta. “Constructing national interests.” European Journal of International Relations, 1996: 280. 
8
 Ibid, 281-282. 
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Constructivism, the focus is on how a nation or in fact any political union has 
arrived at the understandings of their own identity, how they fit into the global 
scene, and the way in which the elite have come to view who their potential 
adversaries are on this global scene. Therefore, from Weldes’ position, one can 
argue that people, whether they are the elite or not, act towards objects (including 
other actors) from the basis of the shared meanings that these objects have.
9
 
Weldes further argues that national interests are constructed “through the dual 
mechanisms of articulation and interpellation, of representations of international 
politics”.10 Articulation refers to a process through which meaning is produced out 
of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources.
11 
Interpellation is a process 
whereby identities or subject positions are created and concrete individuals are 
‘hailed’ into or interpellated by them;12 to clarify, Weldes states that “specific 
identities are created when social relations are depicted, different representations of 
the world entail different identities, which in turn carry with them different ways of 
functioning in the world . . . and make possible different interests”.13 
With these characteristics of Weldes’ Constructivism, the underlying identity that is 
driving Europe's quest for security can be explained. It is evident that to account for 
any state action, it is vital to understand the constructed identities of the state’s 
elites. When we consider that state officials do not conduct foreign and domestic 
policy from a purely rational or impartial position, but rather from the locus of an 
individual or community that has its views and opinions coloured and influenced by 
past and contemporary events, then we can begin to analyse at a deeper level the 
reasons why and how nations such as the United Kingdom and France have acted in 
both the past and present, and may act in the future.  
One significant component of Weldes’ framework is the notion of the ‘blank slate’; 
she observes, “State officials do not approach international politics with a blank slate 
on to which meanings are written only as a result of interactions among states”.14 
Weldes goes on to develop her position by stating, “Instead they approach 
                                                          
9
 Weldes, Jutta. “Constructing national interests.” European Journal of International Relations, 1996: 279. 
10
 Ibid, 287. 
11
 Ibid, 284. 
12
 Ibid, 287. 
13
 Ibid 
14
 Ibid, 280 
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international politics with an already quite comprehensive and elaborate appreciation 
of the world, of the international system and of the place of the state within it”.15 
Therefore, understanding the ‘slate/s’ which underpin the constructed identity and 
conflicting identities of the EU and its Member States is vital if we are to 
meaningfully explore how and why the EU is influenced by its own histories; how 
these events influence contemporary actions, decisions and policies; and 
importantly, to posit how Europe's elites might respond to current and future threats 
to their geostrategic interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Weldes, Jutta. “Constructing national interests.” European Journal of International Relations, 1996: 280 
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LITERATURE REVIEW: 
The literary world is filled with resources concerning security and warfare. From 
humanity’s earliest ages, conflict has been a constant companion and is therefore a 
prevalent topic discussed in a variety of literary genre; from the epics of the Iliad 
and religious texts like the Book of Judges, to contemporary authors such as Martin 
van Creveld and Moshe Dayan, conflict is found everywhere. This abundance of 
literature covers a wide spectrum of topics ranging from feminism and war, right 
through to hard line nationalistic Neo Cons. Perhaps one of the most unique aspects 
of security and warfare literature is that it is very difficult to get either up to date or 
accurate information surrounding many aspects of a particular nation’s military and 
future security strategies. To clarify this position, while nations do publish statistics 
regarding spending and troop numbers, for example, and while governments do 
make their future planning known to a certain degree, this information must always 
be taken with the proverbial ‘grain of salt’. This cautious approach is necessary as 
the security arena, and a specific nation’s military role in it, is by its very nature a 
dangerous one. While it is true that for many nations war is a distant reality, the fact 
remains that even for these nations and particularly for those involved in conflict, 
there are many actors and agents who are more than happy to sabotage or sell 
security information. Thus, any formal announcement or presentation by a national 
government regarding security is likely to contain both undisclosed elements and 
elements that are there to disguise sensitive information. 
This reality is important to highlight as it reminds us to question the credibility of 
any and all information that is gathered; however, the impact of this reality can be 
limited by utilising multiple resources from both primary and secondary resources. 
This combination allows the researcher to gain a more robust and fuller 
understanding of a global sector where lives are truly on the line. 
A Review of the Secondary Resources. 
As stated prior, the literary world is filled with resources regarding security; this 
thesis utilised a wide range of secondary resources from both sides of the Atlantic. 
These resources include publications such as Jane’s Defence, newspaper and media 
articles, journal articles and academic papers. This dual approach, Europe and the 
US, enables this thesis to not only analyse what European authors think about 
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European security, but also what those in the US think. As Weldes’ Constructivism 
is the underpinning theory for this thesis, what state actors think and the attitudes 
they hold is considered pivotal. In addition, because this thesis has a strong focus on 
the credibility of a potential European integrated military, it was vital to include the 
American authors as credibility does not consist simply of what one thinks of 
oneself but more importantly, of what others think of you and of what they do with 
those thoughts. The American position was succinctly summarised by Robert Gates 
when pointed out in a speech in Brussels in 2011 that “the mightiest military alliance 
in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a 
sparsely populated country ... yet many allies are beginning to run short of 
munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference”.16 It is 
interesting to note how the American world viewed the European contribution to the 
Libyan operation; however when we compare the American critique with a 
European perspective, we find both compatibility and incompatibility. According to 
the NATO Secretary General in his 2011 Annual Report, “NATO’s Operation . . . 
was one of the most remarkable in (its) history. It showed the Alliance’s strength 
and flexibility”.17 On the other hand, Lt General Ploeger was “quick to acknowledge 
the contribution of US forces to NATO's success in terms of ISR platforms, 
refuelling capabilities, and low collateral damage weapons – areas in which he 
admits that the European NATO states have a weak hand.”18 
A Review of the Primary Resources. 
As with the secondary resources, the range of primary data is extensive. This thesis 
utilises Constructivist Theory in order to extrapolate the meaning behind the data; as 
such, speeches by the elite of the EU and its Member States have been examined in 
addition to treaties, intergovernmental agreements, regional summits and resolutions 
from the European Parliament. It must be stressed at this point that NATO 
documentation is also considered primary. NATO is the largest and most significant 
                                                          
16
 The Economist. 2011. “Libya, Europe and the future of NATO.” 10 June 2011. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2011/06/libya-europe-and-future-nato (Accessed 20 May 2014) 
17
Etchells,Anthony. Reflections on Op Unified Protector. December 27, 2011. http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/military-
operations/reflections-on-op-unified-protector (accessed March 1, 2014). 
 
18
 Etchells,Anthony. Reflections on Op Unified Protector. December 27, 2011. 
http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/military-operations/reflections-on-op-unified-protector (accessed March 1, 2014). 
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transatlantic military alliance and includes the majority of EU Member States; 
documentation from this alliance has been included in recognition of the significant 
importance that the organisation has played in shaping both the contemporary and 
historical understanding of European military integration. 
Just as with the secondary resources, the reader is quick to discover that the Anglo- 
American / French divide is very much evident. Throughout major European treaties 
such as Maastricht and Lisbon we see continued reference to the divide between 
these two power blocks such as in the Lisbon Treaty which states; 
“The policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the 
specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states, which 
see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”19 
The position that NATO and the US take in the literature is astonishing for its 
prevalence throughout; this will be explored in greater detail in the following 
sections. Not only is the existence of an Anglo-American / French divide evident, 
the EU’s own norms and values are a predominant theme. As the EU claims to be a 
normative actor we find that these values are interwoven throughout the literature; 
however, one can come away feeling that these normative values are more 
decorative than foregrounded or substantial, in many cases they seem to have only 
been ‘tagged onto’ the end of a given statement in an attempt to reinforce the 
cherished position of ‘normative actor’. This can be seen in the following words, “In 
its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens”.20 On the surface, this 
statement seems to clearly indicate a desire to promote its normative values on the 
world stage; yet when compared with EU action and other statements within their 
treaties, one does come away with the sense that the inclusion of norms and values 
in the primary literature is nothing more than well intentioned political jargon. 
One final important aspect that is found throughout the primary data is the evidence 
of vague statements and the reoccurrence of calls to take defence seriously. It is little 
wonder when we consider the considerable sum of money that the US spends on 
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defence, that it is less than complimentary about EU military budgets and remains 
unconvinced that the EU is actually pulling its weight; this commonplace situation 
becomes far more interesting when we find that the EU and its members also 
consistently state this same concern. Throughout the literature, there are multiple 
statements and resolutions calling for the EU Member States to stop making 
uncoordinated spending cuts and to meet the NATO required spending; and yet at 
the same time according to the literature, the same cycle is continued year by year 
and the same calls for cuts are made again and again, often by those who are 
undertaking the most serious cuts. As noted before, this thesis will be utilising 
Constructivism to analyse the data, therefore language is key to understanding the 
constructed identities that are displayed within the primary data; when phrases such 
as ‘turf war’, ‘disappointed’, ‘regret’ and ‘urgent’ are commonplace throughout the 
data it becomes clear that there is a major problem occurring within the EU. 
Constraints and Limitations. 
The available literature provides an adequately clear view into the murky and 
contradictory world of European military integration. It is important to note here that 
despite the considerable amount of literary resources available on this subject, the 
fact that the author only speaks English has limited this research to that of the 
English speaking world. This limitation is most strongly felt in the secondary data 
field, as the author was unable to analyse with any certainty resources from the non-
English speaking world. However, this fact is mitigated firstly by the fact that many 
prominent works have been translated into English, and secondly, and most 
importantly, the vast majority of primary data is available in English, due to the fact 
that both NATO and the EU have English as one of their primary working 
languages. It still must be stressed though that the inability to access French 
language resources in particular was a limitation; while these resources are often 
translated into English, the fact remains that cultural nuances may be lost in 
translation. The fact that all the primary data is available in English makes the 
comparison of the primary and secondary data considerably easier; as such we are 
able to view how in both sets of data we see the same recurring themes, the role of 
the US, the Anglo American French split and the ongoing defence cuts in Europe. 
All these positions are thoroughly examined in this thesis. 
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Comparison of Primary and Secondary Data. 
When comparing the primary and secondary data, it becomes clear that they both 
follow similar themes; we see the continued presence of the United States, the 
conflict between the British and French, the ongoing desire for Europe to be a major 
world player while at the same time seemingly being unable to fulfil this desire. It is 
interesting to note just how complementary both the primary and secondary data are 
to each other; there is an abundance of both positive and negative viewpoints 
towards European integration and yet in both sides, as we shall see in this thesis, the 
literature reinforces the same themes.  
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SECTION ONE: REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS.  
Following the destruction of World War Two and the decades of constant anxiety 
experienced during the Cold War, the nations of the world have worked to 
become increasingly interconnected at all levels of society. No longer does a 
mountain or an ocean separate people from one another and thus create fear of the 
unknown, neither do differences in language and culture prevent people from 
connecting with one another in ways that would have seemed only a few decades 
ago to be science fiction. This interconnectedness has led to new interpretations 
of what constitutes a border and what it means to be a citizen of a nation and also 
most importantly, how business is conducted in the 21st Century. The 
interconnected nature of international business and trade is a double edged sword; 
from one perspective, international trade allows the relatively free flow of goods 
like oil or natural resources from regions such as the Middle East and Africa, 
which are rich in these resources, to nations and regions like Europe, who are 
relatively resource poor in this respect but have an insatiable appetite for fossil 
fuels. This ‘edge of the sword’ sees trade facilitating market expansion through 
the access of raw materials. However the other ‘edge’ is exposed when some 
form of instability exists which threatens crucial areas of trade or lines of 
communication; events which may be geographically isolated now constitute a 
direct threat to regional and even global security. 
This section of will analyse four key regions that affect the EU and its Member 
States’ security. These regions are the Middle East, Eastern Europe, North Africa 
and finally Asia-Pacific. These regions have been chosen due to the impact that 
they have on European security; areas of concern include the Iranian nuclear 
debate, the Arab-Israeli conflict, events in Syria and Libya, the rise of China, and 
finally the crisis in Ukraine. While these sections will only be briefly explored, 
the dual purpose is to give the reader the opportunity to see in a clear and concise 
manner the varied and very real threats that are on Europe’s border regions and to 
demonstrate that the EU’s border regions are highly volatile. 
In addition, these arenas of conflict form the backdrop to our core question: ‘Can 
the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the 
Member States’ militaries?’ as any potential or simply mooted regional military 
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integration will not occur in a vacuum. EU military integration will take place 
under the spotlight of any perceived current or future threat to both a Member 
State or to the Union as a whole.  
 
Regional conflicts with the potential to impact European security: 
The Middle East and North Africa. 
With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent restructuring of the 
region by the victorious Allies of the First World War, the region quickly 
descended into a century of violence and slaughter. This violence has been driven 
by multiple and often contradictory interests, these interests could be loosely 
framed as religious, ethnic, political and nationalistic. Consequently, when the 
Arab Spring burst onto the world scene in late 2010, many held high hopes for 
real change in an area that had long suffered under brutal dictatorships. These 
hopes were initially realised with the relatively non-violent revolution in Egypt, 
which saw Mubarak peacefully step down. Early optimism was soon smashed as 
the conflict in Libya spiralled out of control, closely followed by violence 
erupting in the streets of Syria and in various other arenas such as Bahrain, where 
the Saudi military helped the government to crush opposition forces. This section 
will briefly explore how the violence in Syria and Libya and the uncertainties 
surrounding Iranian nuclear ambitions and the State of Israel are destabilising the 
region. 
Syria. 
With the conflict now nearing the end of its fourth year, the EU still maintains 
that it is taking an active role in the conflict. To date, more than 200 000 people 
have died and 9 million have been displaced either within Syria or in 
neighbouring countries in the ongoing conflict and over 1.6 million refugees have 
escaped the ongoing conflict. Following the bloody repression of anti-government 
protests in Syria in March of 2011, the EU began to formulate a series of 
strategies that it viewed would be the most effective at bringing peace to this 
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troubled land.
21
 The strategies formulated by the EU towards Syria were adopted 
on 24
th
 of June 2011. These strategies were primarily focussed at “support(ing) a 
political process that brings a sustainable solution to the crisis”;22 to achieve this 
change, the EU initially pursued policies that directly targeted Assad’s 
government in a nonlethal manner. The approach had a triple focus: an arms 
embargo which included both weapons and equipment that Assad’s forces could 
utilise in order to violently suppress the protestors; the use of targeted sanctions 
which included a travel ban and asset freeze; and finally, the cessation of the 
bilateral cooperation programmes between the EU and Syrian government under 
the MEDA/ENPI instruments.
23
 It is important to highlight that this arms 
embargo initially targeted both sides of the conflict.24 
In March of 2013, France and Britain successfully lobbied to enable EU Member 
States to openly arm the FSA.
25
 This successful lobbying however came at the 
expense of the very purpose of EU foreign policy, that is, to act with a common 
voice. Of the 28 Member States, it would seem that only Britain and France will 
play a major role in this particular foreign policy strategy.
26 
William Hague, then 
Foreign Secretary of the UK, argued that the strategy of supplying arms to the 
FSA, via the opposition Syrian National Coalition, was a considerable tool to be 
utilised by the EU in order to bring about an end to the conflict and the defeat of 
Assad.
27
 Despite this grandiose claim, the reality is that after this strategy was 
officially announced, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia would 
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deliver advanced S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Assad, regardless of concerns 
expressed by Israel and other nations.28 29 
Rebels’ Free Syrian Army (FSA). 
With the EU’ decision to arm the FSA now firmly established by Member States 
France and Britain, the question must be asked who exactly are the FSA? The 
question is especially important for the EU when we consider that two of its most 
prominent Member States have taken it upon themselves to arm this force; while 
the question is important, the answer is very complicated as there is no clearly 
accepted definition of who or what constitutes the FSA. To further confound the 
issue, those states who have defined this military force often represent them in a 
way that reinforces their own political and strategic interests in the region. A 
salient example of this can be found in the way Iran has described the FSA; a 
senior political figure described them as “extremists, outlaws, saboteurs and 
terrorists”.30 This individual went on to state that the FSA rebels had aligned 
themselves with foreign mercenaries who share no common ideology apart from 
their desire to overthrow the government of Assad. While it can be considered 
relatively easy to dismiss this characterisation of the FSA by Iran as yet another 
example of extremist ideology, Iran’s fears, dismissed by many in the early stages 
of the conflict as ideologically driven propaganda, are now mainstream 
understanding. The FSA was unable to fulfil its ambitious promises of regime 
overthrow; its forces were profoundly affected by a combination of attacks 
against it by well-resourced jihadist groups and an Assad regime strengthened by 
the lack of Western intervention and staunch support from Russia and Iran; 
corruption and internal divisions have also combined to erode the confidence of 
its fighters. Since the start of this bloody war, Britain and France’s ‘moderate’ 
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FSA has in fact joined forces with, or its troops have defected to, Islamist groups 
like the al al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).31 
While the issue of jihadists raised by Iran, and also Russia,  presents a number of 
challenging questions, we must not forget that for both these countries it is 
imperative for their regional goals and, for Iran in particular its national security, 
to paint the FSA in a manner which legitimises their own involvement in arming 
and backing Assad’s forces. However, it is interesting to note that many within 
the EU now share the same concerns that both Russia and Iran have always held 
and this is in fact one of the primary reasons for the initial placement of the arms 
embargo on both sides of the conflict.32   
The EU was understandably concerned that if it provided weapons to the FSA, 
these weapons could potentially fall into the hands of extremists.33 This 
underlying concern is represented in the way in which the EU struggles to define 
the FSA and other rebel forces. There appears to be as yet no concrete definition 
constructed by the EU as to who or what the FSA is, other than what they are not, 
that is to say they are not pro-Assad and thus, are fighting the pro-Assad forces. 
While there is no concrete definition of the FSA, what is now known is that, as 
stated above, within its ranks foreign jihadists, al-Qaeda and ISIS are playing a 
progressively greater role in the conflict.34 In the early months of the conflict, 
Professor Ahamad Moussalli, who is an expert on Islamic movements, stated that 
these rebel groups and their strong links with al-Qaeda would pose a threat to not 
only Syria, but to the wider region.35 This claim would appear to be a prescient 
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description of this progressively bloody war, elements of the FSA and other rebel 
groups have been involved in clashes with Lebanese, Jordanian and Iraqi forces 
on a number of occasions. These foreign fighters have also played a key role in 
numerous atrocities committed against civilians in Syrian towns and cities and in 
particular Shiite, Kurdish and Christian communities.36 37 
This reality is intriguing; it would appear that at the behest of its two most 
powerful Member States, the EU has been jostled into supporting an organisation 
that cannot be defined, has a significant component of known terrorists within it 
and has numerous competing ideologies from multiple regions of the globe which 
all vie for a prominent position and leadership within the FSA. This inability to 
accurately define and understand a military force while actively supporting them 
would seem to go against every normative value of the EU, alongside its own 
regional security concerns. While it is easy to only highlight the role that Britain 
and France have played in arming the rebels, one must not forget that other 
Member States are now actively supporting the FSA. Germany for example is 
providing real time intelligence to the FSA in regards to Syrian military positions 
and movements; this intelligence can then be used by the FSA to more effectively 
defend or assault these Syrian forces.38 It is also important to once again reiterate 
the fact that despite the opposition of many Member States towards directly 
arming the FSA, many of these same Member States, who are so vocal in their 
opposition, are in fact responsible for arming the FSA through third party arms 
transfers which in themselves go against the EU’s arms trading laws and 
procedures. This active participation and collusion by EU Member States calls 
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into question the legitimacy of the EU’s constructed identity in regards to human 
rights.39 
Ukraine. 
What was once deemed by some to be unthinkable is now a very tangible reality, 
conflict has returned to European soil. The current conflict in Ukraine can be 
traced back to the protests in the Maidan Square in Kiev, where pro-Western 
supporters clashed with government forces after the government refused to sign 
an agreement with the EU. The protestors in Kiev, with what seems considerable 
Western backing, were able to overthrow the elected government and put in place 
a new government under President Poroshenko. It must be stressed here that 
although the current conflict can be seen as a direct result of the Maidan Square 
protests, the reality is that Ukraine has long been divided along an East–West 
line. The Western sector has always viewed itself as more European, while the 
East has retained a very strongly pro-Russian position. However, while there are 
differences in cultural outlook, it is pertinent to state that these differences are not 
as entrenched as many within the media would have us believe and as with any 
nation with a large land mass there will always be differences with the regions.40 
Despite this reality, the Maidan protests and the subsequent creation of a new 
government divided the country on an East–West divide. The march to open 
conflict soon began; in February of 2014, the newly formed Parliament voted to 
ban Russian as the second official language. Although this was later rescinded, 
the damage had been done. The anger felt by many in the East at what they 
viewed as being a Western coup was now being exacerbated by this proposed 
legislation.
41
 Only a matter of days after this vote, pro-Russian gunmen seized 
key buildings within Crimea and the Russian parliament approved the use of 
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force to protect vital strategic assets within Ukraine. This approval was a clear 
indication from Russia that they would not sit idly by as Ukraine descended into 
chaos; soon after these events, Russia annexed Crimea. 
The annexation of Crimea by Russian forces stunned Europe and the US; until it 
actually happened, its likelihood had been routinely ridiculed by the intelligentsia 
as an absurd Sarah Palin proposition.
42
 Arguing whether this annexation was 
legitimate or not is outside the scope of this thesis; however, the impact that the 
annexation had on the security of the region very much is. We cannot escape the 
fact that the occupation of Crimea by Russian forces constitutes the largest land 
grab in Europe following the end of the Second World War. The conflict has 
continued on into the present day with what appears to be a stalemate forming in 
the East; Russian-backed forces have been able to cement their hold on large 
swathes of Eastern Ukraine, while pro-Western forces have been unable to 
remove these fighters and each attempt has resulted in considerable civilian 
casualties. It is interesting to note that no clear solution to resolving this conflict 
can be seen on the horizon. With each passing month, Eastern European and 
Caucus States increasingly worry about the potential for a similar conflict to 
spread to their lands;  paranoia about the presence of secret Russian agent 
provocateurs is now widespread amongst many within these nations, while in 
Russia anti-Western rhetoric is heating up both on the streets and at senior levels 
of the Kremlin. This anti-Western paranoia has not been helped by Western 
imposed sanctions on Russia’s elites, while on the other hand continued Russian 
troop movements in Eastern Ukraine have likewise stoked fear and paranoia in 
Europe’s Eastern regions. 
May 2015. 
From the moment research for this thesis began to the final week of writing, the 
globe has undergone considerable upheaval. This section has only briefly touched 
upon two conflicts, Syria and Ukraine; they were highlighted due to the very real 
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security threat that they pose to the EU and the wider region. However, it is 
important here to briefly explore other areas of concern which also pose a threat 
to the interface between European and global security. 
Middle East and Africa. 
As stated prior, the Middle East has been home to almost constant violence for 
the past century. The 21
st
 Century has seen not only this violence continue but 
intensify. Groups such as ISIS, who have appeared almost overnight, now strike 
terror in this region from Lebanon to Yemen. The speed with which ISIS were 
able to establish a new Caliphate, spanning multiple countries, and without any 
Western intervention, is phenomenal. While the world has, by and large, stood 
back and watched, ancient cities and monuments have been reduced to rubble and 
Christians continue to be crucified and burnt alive; Yazidi men and boys are 
being slaughtered while their wives and daughters are sold as sex slaves. 
Homosexuals are thrown from roofs or stoned to death, while those accused of 
witch craft are slaughtered. And yet, in general, the world has not acted with any 
effect. With the start of 2015 we have seen the conflict migrate to Yemen, where 
Iranian backed Shia are fighting Saudi backed government forces. The conflict 
has left millions of people without access to water and other provisions while 
dramatically increasing the chances of full blown interstate conflict between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, which have both been vying for control of the strategic 
waterways on their borders and in the wider Middle East. 
The conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia has been exacerbated by the Saudi 
and Israeli concerns over Obama’s actions and policy direction regarding the 
Iranian nuclear program. These perceptions have led to an unlikely alliance 
between Israel and Saudi Arabia and also to a very public display by the Israelis 
of the potential of their capabilities to significantly impair the Iranian nuclear 
program independently; this occurred in Yemen in late April 2015 when the 
Israelis detonated one of their new, and previously unknown, state of the art 
bunker buster bombs. While the Israelis have proved their potential ability to 
destroy an Iranian nuclear facility, the Saudis have played their hand by utilising 
their mutual defence treaty with Pakistan, which sees thousands of heavily armed 
Pakistan soldiers arrive in Saudi Arabia. This alliance with Pakistan has led many 
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to suspect that if Iran where to obtain a nuclear weapon, that the Saudi regime 
would quickly acquire their own from Pakistan, and thus start a nuclear arms race 
in an incredibly volatile region. 
The Middle East is not alone in facing incredible turmoil and conflict; following 
the Arab Spring and the bombing campaign in Libya, North Africa is now home 
to chronic tribal and regional warfare. Militant Islamist groups have seized entire 
regions and cities and have imposed strict religious laws similar to those imposed 
by ISIS elsewhere. These groups who in some cases have now aligned themselves 
with ISIS have followed in their steps by targeting Christians and other minority 
groups. These Islamist forces now pose an existential threat to southern European 
states and claim that they will strike at European cities and towns from their bases 
in North Africa. Their bold statements are not overstatements but in fact expose 
very concrete threats; when we consider the distance from many North African 
ports under their control and the vast numbers of refugee boats arriving in 
Europe, we see immediately that the threat is viable. The conflict that has arisen 
from the Arab Spring has led to unprecedented numbers of migrants and refugees 
heading to Europe; this in and of itself constitutes a thesis topic, but within the 
limits of brevity it is important to at least raise it. The migrant boats have 
progressively become a serious security threat to the EU as the conflict which is 
occurring throughout Africa is driving more and more people to seek refugee 
within Europe. Many of these people are genuinely seeking a better life for 
themselves; however there appears to be a rather disturbing trend occurring in 
these migrant ships. Christians and other ‘undesirables’ are being thrown 
overboard by their fellow passengers and militants are believed to be positioning 
themselves within these refugee groups in order to infiltrate Europe and lay the 
foundation for future terrorist attacks. The issues briefly outlined here are just the 
tip of the iceberg in terms of security issues arising out of the Middle East and 
North Africa; groups such as Boko Haram and the racial uprisings in South 
Africa all directly or indirectly affect European Security. 
To conclude this section, it is important to now turn to the Asia-Pacific region. 
Despite the geographic distance between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, 
events here have in the past and present had the ability to impact regional security 
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not only in Europe but also globally. Outbreaks such as ‘Bird Flu’ or Communist 
revolutions in Vietnam and China have dramatically affected the globe with the 
repercussions still felt today. Today, the South China Sea has become a potential 
flashpoint between multiple nations and has witnessed many examples of 
belligerent actions undertaken by multiple parties. When we consider that today 
an ever increasing shift of world power towards the East is well under way, we 
can conclude with some certainty that contemporary and future regional realities 
here will grow in commensurate importance to global security.   
Asia-Pacific region. 
Despite being located on the opposite side of the planet, events in this region have 
the potential to dramatically affect European and global security. This region 
boasts almost half the world’s population and many of the world’s fastest 
growing economies.
43
 Such is the importance of this region that the United States 
has initiated a massive “Pivot” to the region; this pivot has seen considerable 
military resources that were once located in Europe moved to the Asia Pacific 
region. With the growing presence of both US strategic assets and its vocal 
support for many of the smaller nations in the region, the balance of power 
appears to be shifting. In addition, the Philippines, Japan and Vietnam have all 
increased their rhetoric and taken action to further the strength of their claims to 
the disputed resources in the two seas.
44
 A pertinent example of the uncertainty 
and potential for conflict in the contested waters is the Philippines; they have 
stated that their 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty, signed with the United States, will 
be honoured by the United States if conflict were to erupt with China. On the 
basis of this confidence, Manila has taken steps to press its claims more 
vigorously than they would have done if they had not believed they had the 
backing of the US.
45
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However, Washington refuses to comment on how the US would respond to 
Chinese aggression in the contested waters. Although the US refuses to comment 
on any potential action, Manila and Washington are both aware of the importance 
of Filipino ports and airfields to Obama’s Pivot. 
The South China Sea is one of the world’s primary trade arteries with over half 
the world’s merchant fleet (by tonnage) and over five trillion dollars’ worth of 
trade sailing through these sea lanes each year. The region has an abundant fish 
stock which is vital to many of the area’s national economies; with the recent 
discovery of significant quantities of oil and gas, control of this region has 
become vital to the national interests of the regional players. The primary 
competitors for these resources are China; Taiwan; Indonesia; the Philippines; 
Vietnam; Malaysia and Brunei; each of these states assert overlapping claims 
regarding land features and the adjacent waters. This potential for a military 
flashpoint is nothing new; since the mid-1970’s, there have been periodical 
skirmishes in the region which have been primarily motivated by the strategic 
need to show military and political dominance over the resource rich islands and 
adjacent seas.
46
 
ANALYSIS Section One: Rewriting the Slate. 
While this thesis is focussing on European military integration, it is vital to 
ground any analysis of the topic in the geostrategic climate within which this 
integration is occurring. Any integration of a region’s military does not occur in a 
vacuum; events and ideals both within the region and outside play an important 
and vital role in shaping any such integration. This section has overviewed events 
that are occurring outside Europe; subsequent sections analyse those existing 
within the EU. It is important to note here that this Section One analysis will be 
brief as it serves simply as a framework and is not central content; furthermore, 
while the subject matter covered in this section is important and influential, the 
issues highlighted here only serve to highlight an aspect of what is on the “slate” 
of EU decision makers regarding military integration.   
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From a constructivist perspective the issues that have been raised here come 
together to constitute one of the foundation blocks upon which the shared 
meanings and understandings of European elite are constructed. As Weldes states, 
“national interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of 
the intersubjective and culturally established meanings with which the world . . . 
and the place of the state in it is understood”,47 Weldes further affirms this by 
arguing, “State officials do not approach international politics with a blank slate 
on to which meanings are written only as a result of interactions among states”.  
These two statements are the bedrock of Constructivism and help us to 
understand just how vital it is to analyse European military integration. The 
“blank slate” which Weldes refers to in this case is filled with the perceived 
knowledge that widespread upheaval and conflict are occurring not only on the 
periphery, as in the case of the Middle East and North Africa, but now also within 
Europe itself – Ukraine. The reality of significant and currently unstoppable 
conflict occurring within Europe is shaping the way in which Europe now sees 
itself in the world; in particular, the idea that EU power and EU normative values 
are capable of bringing peace to the continent is in the process of shattering. The 
slate is being rewritten in Europe and the rewriting is further reinforced by the 
events in the Middle East, North Africa and progressively the Asia Pacific. It is 
important to note here that while these events have affected what is on the EU”s 
slate, this does not mean that the EU or its member states will take effective and 
integrated action to reverse the current descent into war.  Rather, the 
contemporary situation may in and of itself lead to the construction of multiple 
and conflicting slates, a multiple personality disorder if you will, within the EU 
which could all too possibly start a process in which the Member States influence 
what is written one another’s slates in a spiral of confusion and conflict.    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47
 Weldes, Jutta. “Constructing national interests.” European Journal of International Relations, 1996: 280. 
James Comery 51033920 
 
35 
 
SECTION TWO: NATO. 
How effective has Europe’s participation been in an already existing 
integrated multinational military force? 
With any analysis of European defence, one cannot ignore the significant 
position that NATO has played in the shaping and construction of 
contemporary European strategic thinking. Following the destruction of two 
World Wars and countless centuries of religious and political strife, Europe 
alongside the United States (US) formed the North Atlantic Treaty Association 
in 1949. The formation of NATO was in direct response to the perceptions of 
Western Europe and the US that a new adversary was growing in the East, that 
being the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Throughout the Cold War, the 
primary focus of NATO was the defence of Europe from the unabated fear of 
an imminent Soviet invasion, which subsequently never occurred. As such, the 
first official operation conducted by NATO was in fact against Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in the first Gulf War of the 1990s; however, it is important to 
note that while the first Gulf War was the initial, public and visible operation 
conducted by NATO, NATO had in the past conducted more covert operations 
during the Cold war against Communism. One such operation was GLADIO, 
which infamously saw NATO members conduct themselves in a rather 
insidious manner on European soil. While operations such as GLADIO are 
both highly interesting and informative about the lengths that NATO member 
states went to in order to combat the Soviet Union and Communism, they are 
of little relevance to our investigation. 
Section Two explores the relationship between the EU, Member States and 
NATO. It does so in order to foreground an already existent European military 
alliance thus enabling a greater understanding of both historic and 
contemporary strategic thinking among the Member States. The examination 
of the relationship also permits an analysis of how this important alliance may 
impact any future military integration within the EU itself; in addition, it gives 
us a window into how Europe, and its individual Member States, has and does 
conduct itself within an integrated military alliance, both strengths and fracture 
points are revealed. NATO is a powerful military alliance which has involved 
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itself in internationally significant crises, but as we will see the power base is 
currently lopsided and the ability and willingness to act is often ill-matched. 
These are important factors which will inevitably both impact, and be 
impacted by, any integrated EU military force; an integrated EU military 
would require the current longstanding relationship with NATO to be 
profoundly restructured both at a day-to-day operational level and at the more 
existential level, asking “what is NATO?” 
The relationship between two actors as large and diverse as the European 
Union and NATO is understandably somewhat labyrinthine; however because 
the interface between them is so central to the key question of this thesis, the 
relationship will be briefly explored in order to highlight the key aspects. The 
starting position for the analysis must begin with the fact that NATO was 
formed prior to the creation of the contemporary EU, and thus the primary 
focus of the initial treaty was the cooperation between individual NATO 
Member States. This is important because NATO was not initially designed to 
incorporate another large multi-national body within the alliance and thus, 
when an analysis of the EU is undertaken, we discover that the Member States 
all hold considerable differences in their foreign policy each of which has the 
potential to impact their interaction with one another and with NATO itself. 
For example, the Irish constitution is pacifist; in the case of Germany, there 
exists a sense of national guilt over past crimes; as ex-colonial powers, the UK 
and France still view their spheres of influence as occurring throughout their 
now non-extant empires. Understandably, this makes the EU’s ability to speak 
with a unified voice at the NATO level very difficult and fraught with 
competing national political agendas. On top of this, the inclusion of another 
large body, the EU, poses many problems for the smooth operation of an 
alliance as complex as NATO. The EU’s inclusion within NATO also raises 
questions that are the primary focus of this thesis, these being ‘what happens 
when the EU has constructed its own integrated defence force?’; ‘will that 
nullify NATO, or will it strengthen it?’; and perhaps most significantly, ‘will 
Western security be enhanced or conflicted?’ These questions and others will 
prove to be of continued concern to NATO and the EU.   
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With the advent of the EU, the relationship between NATO and its members 
has understandably been impacted. The official relationship between the EU 
and NATO is that in both historic and contemporary contexts the EU views 
NATO as an essential strategic partnership.
48
 In 2008, General Scowcroft 
asked the question in relation to the EU, “What is NATO for?” the answer, 
according to Julian Lindley of the Atlantic Council, is that NATO’s purpose is 
the same as that of the EU, “to aggregate political, diplomatic and military 
effect in pursuit of the credible presence of guaranteeing defence and 
promoting security”.49 To clarify this statement, both the EU and NATO aspire 
to promote stability and security in NATO’s sphere of influence and, one 
could argue, globally. Both actors co-operate on a number of issues of 
common interest and aspire to work in conjunction in the management of 
crises and other shared strategic interests. In many ways these two actors 
mirror each other’s personalities and identities. First, both call Brussels home; 
both are large multinational alliances heavily influenced by bureaucracies; 
both have a large imbalance in terms of economic and military might; both 
alliances include members that hold vastly different and competing foreign 
policies and cultures; and finally, both alliances are comprised of nations that 
profess to be democratic. One could argue that there are many other 
similarities that exist between these two actors, but for the purpose of this 
thesis these are the areas of interest that will be explored. 
Perhaps the most obvious and mundane of the points above is that both these 
actors call Brussels home. While technically a number of other cities are of 
shared importance, Brussels is the most important city as both seats of power 
of these two institutions lie within very close proximity of one another. One 
would expect that due to the close proximity of the two headquarters an 
efficient and fluid dialogue between the two would exist; and yet one would be 
mistaken for taking this position. Both actors have found it increasingly 
difficult to communicate with one another; this is due in large part to the 
lumbering bureaucracies and competing political agendas brought into both 
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organisations by representatives of the member states who are often conjointly 
members of both NATO and the EU.  
One highly visible manner in which the EU and NATO conduct dialogue is 
between the EU Political and Security Committee and subsequently NATO. 
What is interesting about this dialogue is that when these two actors meet, the 
agenda is drawn up to deliberately exclude and avoid any reference to military 
or intelligence issues.
50
 This position is fascinating in its absurdity; the 
question must be asked, ‘what is the purpose of the meetings?’ To comprehend 
just how bizarre this situation is it is helpful to focus on just one committee, 
the EU Political and Security Committee, and consider exactly what its 
purpose is. This committee meets at the ambassadorial level with the aim of 
being a preparatory body for the EU Council. The main functions of this 
committee are “(keeping) track of the international situation and helping to 
define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
including the CSDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and 
exercises its political control and strategic direction”.51 The Council Decision 
of 22 January 2001 “Setting up the Political and Security Committee” section 
1(i) states that an additional purpose is to, “provide a privileged forum for 
dialogue on the ESDP with the fifteen and the six as well as with NATO”. 
This statement is expanded on in section 2, which affirms that, “The PSC plays 
a major role in enhancing consultations, in particular with NATO and the third 
States involved”.52 This remit would on the surface seem to indicate that 
discussing military and intelligence issues with NATO would be well within 
its scope, and yet this crucial aspect of dialogue with a security actor such as 
NATO is deemed to be of no relevance. 
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Lisbon 2010 
As we are beginning to see, the relationship between the EU and NATO has 
long been fraught with difficulties; interestingly, these difficulties all shed 
light on the question of Europe’s credibility as an international actor and the 
potential impact of an integrated military, which we will see in detail at a later 
point. Suffice to say here, attempts by both parties have been made in order to 
address many of the known concerns. While some may look at the numerous 
problems between the two actors as a valid reason to radically alter or even 
terminate the relationship, others see the unique potential possessed by these 
two actors as something that could dramatically alter the world for the better. 
In 2010, then EU President Herman Van Rompuy stated that, “The ability of 
our two organizations to shape our future security environment would be 
enormous if they worked together . . . It is time to break down the remaining 
walls between them”.53 This statement exemplifies the desire of senior EU 
officials to address the troublesome relationship.  
The Lisbon Summit of 2010 was one such attempt to improve the shaky 
relationship. This two-day summit covered a wide variety of topics, but of 
primary European interest was the decision to streamline the Alliance’s 
command structure in order to make NATO less cumbersome and more 
efficient in pursuing its strategic policies. At the time of this summit, this 
factor alone was crucial (as it is still to this day) largely due to the fact that 
many of the EU’s Member States were feeling the bite of severe budgetary 
cuts throughout numerous sectors of their domestic economies.
54
 This summit 
resulted in the issuing of a new ‘Strategic Concept’ for NATO known as the 
Lisbon Declaration; this declaration states,  
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“We have adopted a new Strategic Concept that lays out our vision for the 
Alliance for the next decade:(sic) able to defend its members against the full 
range of threats; capable of managing even the most challenging crises; and 
better able to work with other organisations and nations to promote 
international stability. NATO will be more agile, more capable and more cost-
effective, and it will continue to serve as an essential instrument for peace”55 
It is clear from the comments above that this summit placed great emphasis on 
formulating strategies so that the allies would be able to better manage 
conflicts, prevent crises and stabilise post-conflict arenas; the statements 
which follow similarly highlight these aspirations. The Allies accepted that the 
“promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network 
of partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe, 
such as the United Nations and the European Union”,56 and that “NATO 
leaders reiterated their commitment to ensure that the Euro-Atlantic Alliance 
has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any 
threat to the safety and security of the populations of member countries”.57 
These declarations from the Lisbon Summit clearly demonstrate that from 
2010, NATO was firmly committed to working in partnership with European 
Union; however, lingering doubts still remained.  
For many years, many senior officials have highlighted how both the EU and 
NATO can be slow in responding to crises. As one commentator put it, 
‘NATO has never been very good at doing complex civil-military security, 
while the EU cannot do big defence, but both are needed.’58 This statement, 
which was made soon after the summit, is grounded upon an inescapable truth 
which is that both actors are heavily bureaucratised and seen as being 
strangled by red tape. Examples of the over-regulation and heavy bureaucratic 
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interference that hinder NATO operations are numerous; one merely needs to 
look at the operations in Afghanistan to see the uphill battle that faced NATO 
and the EU if they were to achieve the desired outcomes of the Lisbon Summit 
anywhere other than on paper.  
Using Afghanistan as an example, we are able to witness the byzantine nature 
of the command structure of NATO and the unwillingness, or inability, of 
European States to work together outside of summits and conferences. EU 
Member states who participated in Afghanistan each operated under their own 
national rules of engagement/warfare and also with their own national agendas 
which often contradicted or in fact worked against the collectives of both 
NATO and the EU. The following examples are illustrative only: Italian troops 
in one area would only work 9am-5pm; when on patrol, German troops would 
not leave their vehicles; the British viewed themselves and the Americans as 
the only security actors in the region doing anything of. Further highlighting 
the fragmented and factious relationship on the ground was the fact that in 
2010 there was no security arrangement that would allow NATO forces to 
rescue EU police trainers in Afghanistan. As one NATO diplomat put it, “we 
often turn a blind eye to the political deadlock back in Brussels”.59 Not only 
did this rigid conformity to formal rules prevent the ground forces from 
working together in an efficient manner, it also impacted the logistics aspect of 
the operations. For example, the air-conditioning expenditure of Bagram air 
base for one week was the same cost as the entire budget of a fully operational 
NGO hospital staffed by international professionals for a full year. 
Bureaucratic obstacles are especially evident when one analyses the EU’s 
position in the conflict zone; EU missions such as EUPOL Afghanistan 
actively competed against both NATO and Member States for resources and 
personnel and thus created conflict within the alliance as well as tarnishing the 
image of the EU in the eyes of many senior figures.
60
 
The is a very brief exploration of a small sample of the problems associated 
with NATO and the EU’s operations in Afghanistan which helped shape the 
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increasingly important view within NATO that something needed to be done 
to address this issue of dysfunction. Thus when the Lisbon declaration was 
made, many viewed that both NATO and the EU would finally address the 
lumbering bureaucracies that were hampering their efforts. Not long after the 
declaration, the world would see just how serious the EU and NATO were.  
Libya 
2011 redefined the way in which the world viewed the Middle East; many 
nations were caught off guard by the sudden and often violent revolutions that 
exploded across the region. The world looked on in horror as the death toll 
mounted; as of May 2015, the Libyan and Syrian revolutions have been the 
bloodiest. In response to the massacres in Libya, NATO launched Operation 
Unified Protector (OUP), which was mandated under Chapter Seven of the UN 
Charter and more specifically UN Security Council Resolutions 1970, 1973 
and 2009. According to the NATO Secretary General in his 2011 Annual 
Report, “NATO’s Operation . . . was one of the most remarkable in (its) 
history. It showed the Alliance’s strength and flexibility”.61 The primary 
aspect of this operation was the usage of airpower to deliver precision strikes 
and enforce a no fly zone over Libya. 
As with any military operation, a swift and concise victory is essential when 
considering the human aspect of the conflict. This factor is even more relevant 
today as the post-war West has constructed and now cherishes an identity 
which abhors civilian deaths, however unavoidable, and will not tolerate even 
the death of its own soldiers in conflict. Governmental legitimacy stands or 
falls over these sensitivities. From this perspective, NATO’s operation can be 
seen as a success; as there were no admitted ground troops and little prospect 
of Gaddafi’s troops being able to engage NATO’s airpower, the risk of large-
scale alliance casualties was very limited. How then from the perspective of 
the Lisbon Summit’s major points did the operation run?  
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To begin with, we will analyse how this operation pursued the remit “NATO 
will be more agile, more capable and more cost-effective”. One cannot doubt 
that the NATO air campaign thoroughly smashed Gadhafi’s forces in its many 
engagements. OPU was so successful in the eyes of the new government in 
Libya that NATO was formally asked to continue the mission after the country 
had been declared by the National Transitional Council to be liberated.
62
 This 
request was not based on the incredible power that NATO wields alone, but 
also upon the fact that NATO enjoyed its best ever success rate of avoiding 
civilian casualties; this success, according to Lt General Ploeger, is due to the 
enhanced training of forward air controllers and the successful networking of 
information between pilots and those on the ground in Libya and NATO 
command centres.
63
 Libya was also the first major new conflict that witnessed 
a large scale (for the time) usage of drones or UAVs. The usage of UAVs on 
the modern battlefield has enabled unmatched levels of reconnaissance and 
intelligence gathering which, in regards to Libya, enabled NATO to fulfil all 
three of this section’s points more effectively (agility, capability, cost-
effectiveness). This efficiency is largely due to the fact that UAVs are able to 
remain in flight for long periods of time at no risk to personnel and, in 
comparison to the astronomical costs of modern day aircraft, at a relatively 
low cost. However of pivotal interest to the question of European credibility as 
a security actor, it must be stressed that usage of drones, forward operating air 
controllers, low collateral damage weapons and the ability to refuel in flight 
cannot be attributed to NATO as a whole. The vast majority of the specialised 
equipment that made OPU a success was not European at all, but in fact from 
the United States. Lt General Ploeger, a European and the Deputy Commander 
of NATO’s Allied Air Command, was “quick to acknowledge the contribution 
of US forces to NATO's success in terms of ISR platforms, refuelling 
capabilities, and low collateral damage weapons – areas in which he admits 
that the European NATO states have a weak hand.”64 With this in mind, can 
we really consider the operation to be a NATO success or was it in reality an 
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American victory? This is a key question; it is apparent from the Libyan 
experience that the EU cannot currently be described as a credible 
international security actor. The crucial factors which enabled NATO 
‘success’ in Libya were not European at all but American. 
The notion of a European led humanitarian military intervention delivering 
‘hapless locals’ from a barbaric dictatorship was a reasonable fit with post-war 
European self-understanding; from the beginning, the EU was keen to portray 
itself as the leader of this soi-disant humanitarian intervention; and leaders 
from both NATO and European nations would consistently speak of a unified 
and European-led operation. As we have seen, this was not the case; 
throughout the operation and in the post-conflict analysis, this campaign has 
raised questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s mission and the affect this 
has had on its relationship with NATO, despite the ambitious claims made by 
some NATO and European leaders. The Libyan operation demonstrated how 
ill-equipped the EU was to deal with the kinds of crises which its member 
states are so keen to pursue.
65
 While the EU was ‘talking tough’ and making 
ambitious claims, the reality is that the EU would have been unable to conduct 
this operation without the significant input of an often underplayed American 
role.
66
 In Libya, the EU was unable to be a credible international security 
actor. 
What the Libyan operation has shown is that the EU is still heavily dependent 
on the US for its ambitious foreign policy and security interests. This affects 
the relationship between the EU and NATO significantly; while on paper 
NATO and the EU are mutually complimentary, in reality the American 
component of NATO is becoming increasingly angered and frustrated by 
European idleness and complacency towards their own security needs. Robert 
Gates pointed out in a speech in Brussels in 2011 that ‘the mightiest military 
alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed 
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regime in a sparsely populated country ... yet many allies are beginning to run 
short of munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference’.67 
Following this speech, the Polish Government, which was due to take over the 
EU Presidency the following month, ambitiously stated that it would push for 
a bigger, autonomous, EU military headquarters outside NATO and for greater 
European commitments to promote and pursue its own security needs.
68
 It is 
interesting to note however, that separated from the world of rhetoric and 2-
minute sound bites, and in the real world of conflict, Poland was amongst 
those countries identified by Gates as failing to live up to its own ambitious 
goals in the Libyan conflict.  
The world watched as Europe struggled to deal with a Third World dictator 
right on its doorstep; while every member of NATO voted for the Libyan 
mission, less than a third were able to participate primarily due to the fact that 
their military capabilities were not sufficient.
69
 The impact that this European 
failure has had on NATO’s perception of European effectiveness cannot be 
understated particularly because of the consequent implications for its ongoing 
relations with the EU and, importantly, with a potentially integrated EU force  
With this rather bleak appraisal of the EU Member States’ contribution to the 
operation it is now time to turn to the most important points of the Lisbon 
Declaration, “able to defend its members against the full range of threats; 
capable of managing even the most challenging crises”. 
On the surface it would appear that NATO is more than capable of achieving 
this. With the success of Libya and any analysis of American, British and 
French militaries, might one could safely assume that this aspect of the 
declaration is safe in hand. However as Robert Gates points out, this is just not 
the substance of the situation; despite the fact that every member of NATO 
voted for the mission, less than a third were even able to participate. This next 
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section will analyse four key NATO members, the US and three EU Member 
States – Britain, France and Spain. These four have been chosen to illustrate 
and highlight the incredible difference that exists within not only EU Member 
States but also NATO and thus gives an insight into both the NATO Alliance 
and the potential of any future European military force. It provides an 
important framework to the questions, is European military integration 
possible? Is European military integration desirable? 
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom and her armed forces have a long and proud history. 
Whether fighting Napoleon at Waterloo, sinking the Spanish Armada or 
repelling the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain, the British have always shown 
great tenacity in the defence of the Realm. Following the end of World War 
Two, the UK along with the other European colonial powers began to steadily 
lose much of their supremacy and influence in the world. While the UK retains 
merely a shadow of its former power, it still remains a significant global 
strategic player. It is always difficult to measure the relative power of a nation 
state’s armed forces; with varying opinions of what constitutes power and how 
much of something one needs to be in possession of in order to be deemed 
powerful, it is difficult to give any definitive position on a nation’s military 
capacity. However, an analysis of a nation’s armed forces does yield 
measurable statistics that can be used to quantify how powerful that nation is 
within a set of predefined parameters. As this thesis’ primary goal is not the 
analysis of an individual nation’s military capabilities, this section has relied 
on already completed analysis from ‘European Geostrategy’, ‘Janes Defence’ 
and also the popular site ‘Global Firepower’ for the analysis which follows. 
According to European Geostrategy’s study, “Audit of Major Powers’: the 
world’s fifteen most powerful countries in 2014” which was published on their 
website on 7
th
 January 2014, the United Kingdom is rated as the second most 
powerful actor and was given the label of ‘Global Power’ with a score of 
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48.6%.
70
 This study defines a global power as being “a country lacking the 
heft or comprehensive attributes of a superpower, but still with a wide 
international footprint and means to reach most geopolitical theatres, 
particularly the Middle East, South-East Asia, East Asia, Africa and South 
America”.71 It is interesting to compare this audit to the findings of Global 
Firepower who have listed the UK as being at number five, behind India, 
China, Russia and finally the United States.
72
 The latter article states that, “the 
British will continue to reel in capabilities and spending heading into 2014”.73 
What these two studies clearly highlight is the vast differences in analysing 
power; however, these two studies and others do share useful commonalities. 
A clear example of power can be seen in the defence budget; the UK Defence 
budget has remained around the 3% mark since the late nineties. Since World 
War Two, the defence budget has seen a generally steady decline with no 
major dips or rises apart from the period 1950 through to the 1960s which saw 
a sharp rise in defence spending and then a fall back down to the eight percent 
mark.
74
 This continued overall decline will place the UK below the minimum 
NATO spending requirement of two percent by 2017, according to the 
Financial Times.
75
 It is important to note at this point that the UK Ministry of 
Defence rejects these figures; however if they are true, they would mean that 
by 2017 only one NATO member will meet the required two percent of 
GDP.
76
 This continued decline of budgetary allocation has affected multiple 
areas of the UK’s ability to operate as an effective international security actor. 
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The budget cuts do however mesh nicely with the widespread societal 
rejection of using force to solve conflicts. The old legitimations of ‘Empire’ 
and civilisation’ have long ago been rejected and stripped of their power; as a 
consequence, few politicians, if any, venture to make a strong case for 
increased military spending. 
Perhaps the most visible change in Britain’s defence force is the Royal Navy; 
once seen as invincible, it is now barely a whisper of its past glories. However 
while the UK’s navy no longer rules the waves, it is far from impotent. The 
Royal Navy is set to receive 33% of the next ten-year defence budget which 
amounts to 17.4 billion pounds; this will be used to construct surface craft 
alongside that of the UK’s submarine force.77 In 2014, the UK launched the 
first of two Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.
78
 This launch marks a key 
milestone for the Royal Navy’s strategy to regenerate its carrier strike ability 
by 2020. Commodore Jerry Kyd, the Commander of the UK Maritime Task 
Group, stated in regards to the launch “(this is) a strategically noteworthy date 
. . . this capability brings you so much military flexibility but also great 
political choice”.79 Commodore Kyd’s statement clearly shows the significant 
impact that just these two aircraft carriers will have on the ability for the UK to 
project power on the international stage. It is important to note that both the 
French and US navies were instrumental in the development of these ships; 
Admiral Zambellas noted that maritime power projection required a 
“partnership approach” and that “the extraordinary generosity of [the UK’s] 
US and French allies is allowing [the UK] to regenerate [its] carrier strike 
capability”.80 While these two new carriers have the potential to greatly impact 
the ability of the UK to operate globally in an effective manner, it must be 
pointed out that at present the F 35 aircraft which will operate from these ships 
are currently behind schedule and appear to be facing endless technical 
difficulties which have effectively grounded them, not to mention the 
ballooning costs associated with the program. 
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The expanding costs of the F 35 program have not been of any assistance to 
the budget cuts faced by the Royal Air Force (RAF) following the financial 
crisis of 2008 and the predominant focus on land forces during the 
Afghanistan campaign. However with the drawdown of the conflict in 
Afghanistan, the RAF is to receive a total of £44.5 billion; that is, 28% of the 
10 year budget will be allocated to aviation projects, with combat air 
programmes including the Eurofighter Typhoon, Lockheed Martin F-35 and 
unmanned air vehicles to account for £18.5 billion.
81
 The RAF, Navy and 
Army are becoming progressively unified under the strategy known as “Future 
Force 2020” structure, which was outlined in the current coalition 
government's Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of September 
2010. This strategy is an attempt by the UK to integrate the three arms of its 
military into a more homogenous unit that will be better able to conduct 
operations in the future by utilising small numbers of highly trained and 
equipped defence personal as opposed to a large cumbersome military.
82
 
France 
From the inception of NATO, European nations have been at the heart of the 
organisation. However, it is important to qualify this statement; not all 
European nations are members of NATO and throughout its 70-year history, 
many European nations who are members have not worked towards NATO’s 
ambitions and have at times actively worked against it. Following World War 
Two, France aspired to be one of the three world powers alongside the US and 
the USSR; this aspiration had negative impacts on France’s relationship with 
NATO. In the 1960’s, Charles de Gaulle announced his decision to pull France 
out of NATO’s integrated military command. For many decades, de Gaulle’s 
decision and the creation of a nuclear force de frappe (strike force) were 
regarded as forming the cornerstone of France’s independent defence policy. 
France viewed NATO as an organisation in which America and the UK 
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‘stitched up deals’.83 France maintained this isolationist approach to NATO 
with varying intensity until 2009 when President Nicolas Sarkozy reversed de 
Gaulle’s decision and announced France’s full return. While Sarkozy worked 
towards bringing France back into positive relations, his decision must be 
understood in the context of France’s continued wish to promote and 
participate in a European-wide defence force rather than as a reluctant but 
unavoidable acknowledgement of the supremacy of NATO. 
This historic antipathy and ambivalence of France towards NATO is a clear 
example of how any military alliance containing multiple nations with 
independent foreign policies is at risk of internal division and even fracturing. 
Although there is a discernible European identity under construction, national 
identities, pride and ambitions are still profoundly influential. Were a smaller 
nation to act in this manner, one could easily dismiss its actions as effectively 
irrelevant to the overall scheme; however when a nation as powerful as France 
acts in this manner, it is important to take note and analyse the contemporary 
French Military. 
For many decades, France has always placed a great emphasis on its 
independent defence capabilities; as a consequence, France’s military 
expenditure has always remained one of the highest in the world. However, as 
with many other Western nations and in particular European nations, France’s 
military is facing continued cutbacks. Between 2014 and 2015, the 
government will cut 7,500 defence jobs with that number set to increase to 
more than 34,000 by 2019, (note following this report the number of troops to 
be cut has been slightly scaled back).
84
 This is a staggering number; when we 
consider that the total number of active defence personal is around the 230,000 
mark, we realise that this cut of 34,000 will see nearly 15% of current 
personnel lose their jobs. This shredding of defence spending will have stark 
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implications on France’s ability to operate successfully on the international 
stage, not to mention the serious impact that this will have on morale within 
the French military and also on the French economy as these 34,000 troops 
will need to find gainful employment of some sort within the civilian market.  
The effects on morale are not merely a hypothetical assumption; in May 2014, 
France’s four top Generals threatened to resign if any further cuts were made 
to defence.
85
 According to the London Telegraph, the Generals warned that 
“any more cuts – beyond those approved in a five-year defence budget in 
December – would torpedo France's ability to undertake operations in places 
like Mali and the Central African Republic”.86 These warnings came to light 
after Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French Defence Minister, stated that the cuts 
would result in “very grave military consequences" and leave France's 
terrestrial army "under-equipped and rapidly unable to conduct new 
operations”.87 The Defence Minister further warned that the military was close 
to “near exasperation” as a result of the substantial cuts. The dire 
consequences that have been laid out by the Generals and Defence Minister do 
not paint a good picture for the future of French defence. It must be stated here 
though as a matter of context that, generally speaking, whenever defence cuts 
are made Generals are often quick to condemn any such move as being akin to 
a national emergency; however in this case, the scale of these cuts would seem 
to bear witness that French defence may very well be set back decades as, 
according to the Generals, the training received by defence personnel is 
already substandard and new programs for contemporary and vital weapons 
platforms such as drones and satellite programs will be scrapped. 
What does this mean for French involvement in NATO? It would be 
reasonable to posit that these budget cuts will result in a less able and less 
willing French involvement in NATO operations at the very time when a well-
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resourced and competent French military is urgently needed as NATO and the 
EU face increasing levels of violence on their immediate borders.  
What does this mean for Europe as a credible actor on the international stage? 
With one of the biggest actors in the EU shredding its military spending, it is 
unrealistic for the EU to contemplate forming a credible integrated force at this 
stage. 
Spain  
When one thinks of the Euro crisis, Spain is often one of the first countries to 
be called to mind. Spain, alongside a number of other European nations, has 
borne the brunt of the financial crisis. With 50% youth unemployment and 
wide-spread cutbacks throughout multiple government sectors, it is little 
wonder that defence has seen considerable cutbacks. In 2014, the defence 
budget was cut by 3.2% (7.77 billion US$),
88
 these cuts are part of an overall 
downward trend in Spanish defence budgets which have seen, since the crisis 
in 2008, an astounding 32% drop.
89
 However, despite these cuts Spain is set to 
spend 60 billion on its defence budget between 2010 and 2015; it is important 
to bear in mind that this figure is less than 1% of GDP and considerably lower 
than the 2% mark that is required by NATO. These budget cuts, as with the 
other nations mentioned, strike at the heart of Spain’s ability to operate in an 
increasingly destabilised world and one in which many non-Western nations 
are now rapidly closing the gap or even surpassing the West in terms of 
military hardware. Although the cuts in military spending will have a profound 
impact, Spanish politicians are not quick to persuade their constituents to 
reverse the trend. For many Spaniards still reeling from the fallout of the 
financial crisis, cultivating an expensive national ‘European’ identity seems a 
frivolous luxury; their focus is jobs for Spaniards, health care for Spaniards; a 
future for Spaniards.  
Perhaps the greatest visible indicator of Spanish defence cuts is that of the 
decommissioning of 18 naval ships over the past few years;  perhaps the most 
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iconic was the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier Príncipe de Asturias, 
which will seriously limit the ability for Spanish forces to operate effectively 
and globally. While the process of decommissioning ships is routine and often 
necessary in order to ensure that a nation’s naval forces remain competitive 
and relevant to contemporary issues by replacing some (if not all) with more 
up to date vessels, this is not the case with Spain. Currently the construction of 
new ships has been placed on hold, with no confirmed start date for 
construction.
90
 However in balance, it is necessary to point out that the 
Spanish navy has received two US Destroyers, with another two set to be 
acquired in 2015. This restructuring of the Spanish Navy reflects an overall 
trend within the Spanish military of attempting to cut costs considerably by 
eliminating single purpose and high cost detachments and weapons systems 
such as airborne units and replacing them with multipurpose units and 
weapons systems.
91
 While it is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss military 
strategy, it is important to highlight the problem with this approach. We can 
consider the Spanish approach in this way – if a law firm specialising in one 
area of law had, overnight, to incorporate multiple other areas of law with 
fewer personnel and on a lower budget, how well would we expect that law 
firm to do on the open market? This reality is not just limited to Spain; as we 
have seen in both France and the UK, major cost cutting exercises are 
underway which have the potential to severely limit the professionalism of 
these forces. Again we are forced to ask, are the EU’s ambitious plans to form 
an effective integrated fighting force realistic within the current economic and 
political context. 
United States. 
The United States is today the unquestioned sole military superpower on the 
planet. The US has the ability to successfully operate anywhere in the world 
with overwhelming force. As stated prior, the US is the real backbone of the 
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NATO alliance and it can readily be argued that the US is what makes this 
alliance an actual credible global strategic actor. While many may correctly 
point out that the United States lost in Vietnam and arguably also in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, this in no way reflects on the power of the military, but 
rather on domestic politics and the rules of warfare that the US chooses to 
abide by. US dominance is a result of the post-war Military Industrial 
Complex, which is perceived as either the epitome of all that is wrong in 
America or a great patriotic institution found throughout the States. In order to 
understand the sheer scale of the US defence budget it is first necessary to 
analyse the total global expenditure (barring the US). The total global military 
budget in 2012 was $652 Billion (US), while the US alone had a declared 
budget of $682 Billion.
92
 At this point, it is of relevance to state that the total 
actual global figure will be much higher as many prominent nations are loath 
to reveal true statistics, however these two figures do serve to clearly show the 
great gap between the US and the rest of the world. The US dominance is 
additionally evident at sea; the US Navy currently boasts 19 Aircraft carriers 
compared to 12 others globally.  
This position of sole dominance is changing however; there are rapid advances 
in the Chinese military and there is a subsequent rapid rise of military 
spending in the South-East Asian region, as outlined in Section One. These 
factors combine to challenge the unquestioned power of the US. It is important 
to note, that there is little to suggest that China will be on an equal footing with 
the US in the next few years; however, the gap is quickly closing especially 
within cyber warfare capabilities. As stated prior, the South-East Asian region 
is rapidly expanding its military capabilities at a time when the West is 
dramatically reducing its defence budgets. The US is not exempt from this 
trend. The Pentagon is facing a staggering one trillion dollar cut to its budget 
over the next ten years.
93
 While one can argue that this is both necessary and 
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practical, when we consider the withdrawal from both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
this figure still remains staggeringly high. Chuck Hagel, the former Defence 
Secretary, stated, “"We ... face the risk of uncertainty in a dynamic and 
increasingly dangerous security environment . . . budget reductions inevitably 
reduce the military's margin of error in dealing with these risks, as other 
powers are continuing to modernize their weapons portfolios.".
94
 This 
statement, made in early 2014, clearly foregrounds the current fears of many 
within the US and globally; when we consider the ISIS onslaught in the 
Middle East, alongside the on-going conflict in Ukraine and the tense situation 
in the South China Sea, it is easy to understand the concern expressed in 
Hagel’s speech. The military budgets underlie a new strategic reality for the 
US which is that the US will no longer be able to adequately respond to 
multiple conflicts at once, instead the US will need to focus on a smaller 
highly trained military. This position will significantly affect the ability of 
NATO to operate on the global scene; as a consequence, the EU’s ability to 
fulfil its geostrategic goals will also be affected, even if the full integration of 
the member states’ militaries is achieved. Chuck Hagel’s statement above also 
highlights the fact that the gap between the technologically advanced US 
military and other potentially or actually hostile actors is being gradually 
eroded. This is exemplified in the Chinese military’s development of weapons 
that are designed to neutralise US Aircraft carriers and thus create area denial 
to the US; this example alone should be of concern to US law makers, to 
NATO members and also to the EU.  Within this dual setting of retrenched US 
military spending and consequent capacity alongside the growing capabilities 
of ambitious new actors, it is hard, given all the constraints outlined above, to 
envisage an integrated European military being able to act effectively and 
credibly and alone.  
The proposed cuts to the US Army will see its numbers fall below that of 
World War Two. The Army is currently around 520,000 troops; the proposed 
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cuts would see this number shrink to between 440,000 and 450,000.
95
 This is 
clearly a significant drop in personnel; however when one views the cuts in the 
light of technological advancements in robotics and drone usage, this number 
may not be so significant over the course of a decade. For example, the Army 
is developing driverless trucks that are essentially autonomous and tanks and 
other armoured vehicles that replace crew members with computers. It is also 
important to briefly point out that the US has for a long time utilised Private 
Military Contractors to fulfil a variety of roles within the military. It is 
therefore premature to make a definitive argument about this drawdown 
without competent analyses of the contemporary force structure of the US 
military, which is not the purpose of this thesis. 
Despite these cutbacks, the US still remains the dominant force within both 
NATO and on the global scene and is therefore incredibly significant to world 
politics. 
Analysis of Nations.  
This analysis has highlighted a widespread trend cost cutting throughout the 
Western nations’ militaries. This cost cutting has intensified an already 
ubiquitous problem found within NATO – that being an unwillingness to meet 
the 2% requirement of GDP on defence. This factor alone raises many 
questions in regards to the question, “Can the EU be a credible international 
security actor without the integration of the Member States’ militaries?” If EU 
Member States are currently unwilling or unable to take their responsibilities 
under NATO seriously, then why would any state or non-state actor be 
expected to take any future declarations emanating from these Member States 
seriously? It can be contended that this unwillingness to take defence seriously 
can in part be attributed to the large US military presence in post-war Europe; 
European governments have been lulled into a false complacency, someone 
else has always ‘stepped up’. Whenever NATO has conducted military 
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operations in Yugoslavia or Libya for example, it has been the United States 
and not Europe which has provided the key weapons systems and intelligence 
that enabled the successful outcomes of these operations. Europe has been able 
to utilise the high cost resources of the US in order to conduct its own hard 
power policies, while at the same time criticising the US for spending 
considerable sums of money on the very defence which Europe depends on in 
order to conduct its operations. As stated previously, every Member State in 
NATO voted for action in Libya and yet less than a third could participate. 
Those that did participate were in many instances utterly dependent upon the 
United States to re-arm them and provide critical intelligence, air to air 
refuelling and precision munitions. With the continued budget cuts, how less 
able is the EU Member States’ ability to operate independently of the US 
going to be? When this acute question is asked within the recent contexts of 
the downing of the Malaysian airliner and continued hostility on Europe’s 
immediate border and sphere of influence, another question is raised: Is 
Europe going to be relegated to a secondary actor by the very nations who are 
in desperate need of a credible security actor to assist them? 
These questions and others have plagued aspects of the EU and Member States 
for a number of years; as such, the dwindling defence budgets have led both 
the EU as a whole and Member States individually to begin earnestly looking 
for ways in which the EU can remain a credible security actor on the global 
scene. 
The next section will analyse how the EU and Member States are attempting to 
address these problems and others, and how these attempts are pushing the EU 
to an inevitable integrated European defence force. 
NATO Summit 2012. 
This summit was the focus of widespread protests from many thousands who 
were angry about both the war in Afghanistan and climate change. These 
protestors actually succeeded in hacking into both the Chicago police and 
NATO websites while the protestors were on the streets. This successful 
hacking must have been of particular embarrassment to NATO as cyber 
security and what is referred to as ‘smart defence’ were being discussed at this 
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summit. While these protests were underway, this summit’s focus centred 
around three primary themes: “the Alliance's commitment to Afghanistan 
through transition and beyond, ensuring that the Alliance has the capabilities it 
needs to defend its population and territory . . . ensure(ing) that the Alliance 
has the capacity to deal with the challenges of the 21st century . . . and it will 
strengthen NATO's network of partners across the globe”.96 These three 
overall themes were further explored by the discussions surrounding smart 
defence, which can be understood as “greater prioritisation, specialisation and 
cooperation, into a long-term capability strategy”.97 In their approach to 
addressing smart defence, the summit was focussed around three major 
components (alongside the three major themes) these being:  
“First of all, a tangible package of multinational projects to address 
critical capability shortfalls. Secondly, longer-term multinational 
projects that include missile defence, Alliance Ground Surveillance 
and air policing. Finally, the NATO Summit will agree strategic 
projects for 2020, covering areas such as Joint Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance and air-to-air refuelling”.98 
The first point, “a tangible package of multinational projects to address 
critical capability shortfalls” is in direct response to firstly, the events in 
Libya, which were discussed earlier, and secondly, to the fact that the 
capabilities short fall is of an on-going concern to NATO, especially when we 
consider the substantial cutbacks that have occurred within European defence 
sectors, and which were explored earlier in this section. This first point lies at 
the heart of NATO’s Force 2020 strategy, this strategy’s aim is “to ensure that 
NATO retains and develops the capabilities necessary to perform its essential 
core tasks collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security – 
and thereby to play an essential role promoting security in the world”.99 This 
strategy would appear to be of most concern to NATO leadership as just after 
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this statement the declaration states “We must meet this responsibility while 
dealing with an acute financial crisis and responding to evolving geo-strategic 
challenges”.100 This rather emphatic statement, when viewed in the light of the 
severe cutbacks outlined earlier, has either fallen on deaf ears or the statement 
was made prematurely. One must question why statements such as this are 
made when it is clear that many members and specifically European members 
are unwilling and/or unable to fulfil these statements. Statements such as “the 
significance of sharing responsibilities, roles, and risks to meet the challenges 
North-American and European Allies face together”101 seemed to have fallen 
on deaf ears with the continued mass cutbacks of defence budgets. It is little 
wonder, to reiterate, that Robert Gates pointed out in a speech in Brussels in 
2011 that “the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an 
operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country ... yet 
many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the US, once 
more, to make up the difference”102 and that following this speech, the Polish 
Government, which was due to take over the EU Presidency the following 
month, stated that it would push for a bigger, autonomous EU military 
headquarters outside NATO and for greater European commitments to 
promote and pursue its own security needs.
103
  
It would appear that the first point of this summit, while valid, has not been 
well implemented; how then is the second point being implemented? The 
second focus point was “longer-term multinational projects that include 
missile defence, Alliance Ground Surveillance and air policing”. For the 
purpose of this thesis we will focus on the air policing aspect of this point. 
Following the annexation of Crimea, Eastern European nations were 
understandably concerned that similar actions might occur again; this was 
especially the case for nations such as Latvia which has a large Russian 
minority within its borders. To help alleviate concerns, NATO members 
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initiated a number of air policing missions in the region. These missions saw 
combat aircraft from a number of nations participate in air policing missions 
over the Baltic States, Poland and Romania; currently, the nations who are on 
patrol are Poland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Canada and France.
104
 This 
mission has been an on-going rotation for the past ten years, according to 
NATO, “NATO member states have taken turns sending fighter aircraft to 
police the airspace of the Baltic States as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania do not 
have fighter jets of their own. NATO’s air-policing mission protects the safety 
and integrity of Alliance airspace on a 24/7 basis and Allies take up the patrols 
for a four-month rotation”.105 It is interesting to note that following the crisis 
in Ukraine, additional jets have been allocated to this mission. This on-going 
mission would appear to fulfil the requirements of this focus point. 
The final focus point that was raised, “NATO Summit will agree strategic 
projects for 2020, covering areas such as Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance and air-to-air refuelling” will be analysed in depth in the 
final section of this report, and therefore will not be covered here. 
From this brief analysis of the 2012 Summit, it is clear that the European 
members of NATO are still divided in terms of the capabilities and the 
political will to act in a decisive manner. When we combine this analysis with 
that of the brief overview of the NATO members, we are left wondering to 
what extent the Summit’s primary focus points have actually been adhered to. 
The focus point of “a tangible package of multinational projects to address 
critical capability shortfalls” would appear to have been completely ignored; 
in fact, one could argue that many nations are actually working against this 
notion. While it is possible to argue that it is in fact the severe cutbacks at the 
national level which have led the EU Member States to work in collaboration 
together on defence projects (something which will be explored in the next 
section), one is still left with a real doubt about the willingness of many 
European NATO members to take seriously their stated commitments to 
upholding a required level of GDP spending as well as a addressing the 
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capabilities short falls that have been prevalent throughout NATO for many 
years. Regardless of what one thinks about US foreign policy, the fact remains 
that for many years the United States has consistently stated that Europe needs 
to spend more on defence in order to shore up the gross imbalance in both 
capabilities and expenditure that is found throughout the Alliance. In 2014, 
Secretary of State John Kerry strongly urged NATO members in Europe to 
bolster their defence spending in light of the ongoing destabilisation of 
Ukraine and the increasingly hostile (in the US view) actions of Putin. Kerry 
stated that “We cannot continue to allow allied defence budgets to shrink . . . 
together we have to push back against those who try to change sovereign 
borders by force.”106 Despite this recent statement and the fact that the on-
going crisis in Ukraine continues to be played out right on the EU’s immediate 
border, it is unlikely that any radical change in defence spending can be 
expected. As stated prior in this report, for many years the US and larger allies 
have contributed more than 70% of NATO military spending and only a 
handful of members actually meet the requirement of the 2% GDP mark. 
European members of NATO on average only spend 1.6%n of their GDP on 
defence (2013)
107
, and this number is set to fall with the ongoing cuts in the 
poorer members’ nations, and particularly when we consider the considerable 
cuts that are underway within France, this figure can only go down. 
While the practice of European NATO members cutting defence spending 
make an integrated and credible force extremely difficult to envision in the 
near future, it also greatly angers political leaders within the US; in 2011, 
Former Defence Secretary Robert Gates, in a scolding final speech at Brussel 
said, “I am the latest in a string of U.S. Defence Secretaries who have urged 
allies privately and publicly, often with exasperation, to meet agreed-upon 
NATO benchmarks for defence spending.”108 Even European leaders in 
NATO can see the ‘writing on the wall’; last September, NATO Secretary 
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General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said, “European nations can, and should, do 
more, to match America’s commitment.”109 And yet despite these continued 
stinging rebukes from the US, penetrating self-diagnosis from some European 
leaders, and empty promises to amend their ways from others, nothing has 
actually changed in fact, it is possible to argue that not only have the European 
members of NATO not increased their spending and consequent ability to 
participate in NATO, they have in fact gone even further backwards in both 
spending and NATO participation. 
At this juncture, the question is asked, should the EU be taken as a credible 
global security actor, or even further, should EU Member States be taken as 
credible international security actors. In the author’s opinion, the EU should 
not be considered as such, while Member States such as the UK and France are 
moving away from their remaining, but eroding, credibility. To further move 
along this line of thinking, we recall that the EU has made many ambitious 
statements which emphasise its intention, willingness and determination to 
uphold human rights and to protect vulnerable people around the globe.  But 
can we really consider the EU a “normative actor” when it is clearly unwilling 
and unable to stand up for human rights in conflict zones around the world and 
even in its own backyard? Where was the EU in Mali? Where is the EU 
security force in Eastern Ukraine? Why have we not seen the deployment of 
the EU Battlegroups that were set up for just these types of events? These 
questions will be investigated in Section Three.  
Wales Summit 2014. 
The concerns that have been raised so far in this section were still very much 
in evidence when the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales was held in September of 
that year. These same issues were in fact being amplified by the annexation of 
Crimea by Russian forces and the continuing conflict in Ukraine, not to 
mention the unprecedented levels of barbarity in the Middle East. With such 
unparalleled violence taking place in Europe’s sphere of influence, it was vital 
that this conference successfully addressed these concerns. 
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The following analysis of the 2014 Summit will focus on three primary areas 
of interest identified in the official declaration; firstly, the adaptation measures 
and the components required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the 
security challenges it might face and the way in which the Wales Summit has 
approached these tasks; secondly, the statements surrounding the issue of  
Russia's illegitimate annexation of Crimea and the implications this has on 
Eastern Member States; and finally, the issues surrounding Member State 
expenditure.  
As we explored earlier in this paper, the speed at which Russian forces were 
able to successfully annexe the Crimea caught many Western observers off 
guard. For many years, it had been assumed that the Russian military was 
incapable of successfully launching such an operation and yet, not only had 
Russia successfully annexed Crimea, but they had done so with a level of 
speed and coordination that defied all previous assumptions regarding their 
capabilities. NATO members understood that the Crimean operation had 
caught them off guard and they needed to act with credibility. 
One of the potentially pivotal policies to come out of Wales was the stated 
goal of enhancing the NATO Rapid Response Force (NRF).
110
 This NRF is 
designed to be deployed and operational in only a matter of days. As a result 
of Wales, the NRF would include the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force 
(VJTF), a new Allied joint force that would be able to deploy within a few 
days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO 
and European territory, such as Ukraine
111
. To expand on the purpose of the 
NRF and subsequently VJTF: the NRF’s primary function according to NATO 
is to “provide a rapid military response to an emerging crisis, whether for 
collective defence purposes or for other crisis response operations. The force 
gives NATO the means to respond swiftly to various types of crises anywhere 
in the world. The NRF is based upon a rotational system were nations commit 
land, air, naval or special forces units to the Immediate Response Force for a 
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twelve-month period.
112
 In theory, the NRF allows NATO to have a very 
visible presence potentially anywhere in the world at very short notice, and 
thus is a very powerful tool to be utilised. 
Where the Welsh conference has significantly impacted the NRF is that the 
Member States agreed to conduct short-notice exercises to analyse how 
effective and ready the NRF is at any particular time. In conjunction with these 
tests there were plans drawn up to establish an appropriate command and 
control presence and some on location force enablers in the territories of 
eastern Allies at all times; there were to be contributions from Allies on a 
rotational basis, focusing on planning and exercising collective defence 
scenarios. If required, they will also facilitate reinforcement of Allies located 
at NATO's periphery for deterrence and collective defence.
113
 This proposed 
action can be clearly understood as sending a straightforward and 
unambiguous message to Putin about any further push eastward and would 
seem to indicate that NATO is taking proactive action towards what many 
Members view as unacceptable Russian aggression on Europe’s borders. This 
proactive stance can be clearly seen in the statement from the NATO 
Declaration, Article 23, “The Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses 
no threat to Russia. But we cannot and will not compromise on the principles 
on which our Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest”.114 
These words, along with the military build-up on the eastern borders of the 
EU, clearly demonstrate that NATO is not only willing to talk tough on 
Russia, but also it would appear that they are more than willing to physically 
back up their assertions. 
Before we move to the next issue, it is important to briefly update the action 
surrounding the NRF; in February of 2015, NATO leadership unequivocally 
stated that their path to ensure the success of the NRF is making good progress 
and that NATO has “increased the presence of land, maritime and air forces in 
                                                          
112 NATO. “The NATO Response Force.” NATO. October 2013. 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_10/20131018_131022-MediaBackgrounder_NRF_en.pdf 
(accessed March 15, 2014). 
113
 Ibid 
114
 Ibid 
James Comery 51033920 
 
65 
 
the eastern part of its territory. These Assurance Measures initiated in May last 
year are continuing through 2015, as planned. They demonstrate Alliance 
resolve and solidarity”.115 This statement clearly indicates that NATO is taking 
the threat from Russia seriously and has acted accordingly. Finally, it is 
important to note that France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United 
Kingdom are to assume the role of a framework nation for rotations of this 
force in the coming years. It is interesting to note that Spain is amongst those 
members who have volunteered and could be an indication of a willingness to 
participate within NATO by the Spanish. 
The 2014 Conference set out, in no uncertain terms, the NATO view towards 
the annexation of Crimea. NATO and its members strongly objected to and 
condemned the occupation and annexation of Crimea by Putin. Unsurprisingly, 
Crimea and the wider conflict in Ukraine played a major role in the 
discussions and policy formulation at the Wales Summit. The opening 
statement from the official declaration clearly indicates how serious NATO is 
regarding Ukraine, 
“We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North 
Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Wales at a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic 
security. Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally 
challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.”116 
This statement, unlike many that have been made by NATO and the EU is 
actually being implemented; implementation measures include continuous air, 
land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern 
part of the Alliance, on a rotational basis. These will provide the fundamental 
baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence, and are flexible and 
scalable in response to the evolving security situation.
117
 It is important to 
recall here that these measures are not just limited to EU Member States but 
also include a number of non-EU states such as Azerbaijan and Georgia. The 
success of these measures is yet to be fully realized; as with any conflict, it is 
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difficult to predict the outcome. However, it would be reasonable to suggest 
here that if NATO had not undertaken these new measures then the tensions in 
the region would have been exacerbated as the eastern member states of the 
EU and NATO would have felt even more vulnerable than they already do. 
However, it is also pertinent to state that these measures while reassuring, do 
in fact point to the very real prospect of a heavily militarized eastern border of 
the EU; this is a reality which the EU did not envisage. 
Finally, we look briefly at the financial declarations made at the Welsh 
Summit. NATO leaders once again called upon its members to halt any further 
reductions in defence spending. Sadly, as highlighted frequently throughout 
this thesis, this statement is as effective as a broken record and is therefore 
easily dismissed. Europe has shown no signs of reversing the downward trend 
of its defence budgets and, as highlighted earlier, apart from a few exceptions 
it would seem that despite the pledge made at the Summit this trend is set to 
continue even in the face of the rapidly deteriorating security situation on 
Europe’s periphery.  
NATO Response Force. 
With any discussion concerning European defence integration, one cannot 
ignore the major role that NATO plays. While Europe has developed on paper 
its own independent Battlegroup initiative, NATO has also constructed its own 
rapid deployment force - the NATO Response Force (NRF) and more 
specifically the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).
118
 The NRF "is 
a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force made up of 
land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces components that the 
Alliance can deploy quickly, wherever needed".
119
 To expand, the NRF would 
appear to be very similar to the EU's Battlegroup strategy; however, the 
primary difference is the size and scope of the NRF. The NRF is currently 
comprised of three elements; first, a command and control element from the 
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NATO Command structure; secondly, the Immediate Response Force, which 
is a joint force of around 13,000 high-readiness troops provided by Allies; and 
thirdly, a Response Forces Pool, which can supplement the Immediate 
Response Force when necessary.
120
  The size of the NRF means that this force 
can not only deal with small scale issues as can the  Battlegroup, but it also 
forms a formidable fighting force for regular combat missions and is one of the 
driving forces behind the transformation of NATO.   
The Immediate Response Force has:  
 A brigade-sized land component based on three Battle Groups and 
their supporting elements.  
 A maritime component based on the Standing NATO Maritime Group 
(SNMG) and the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 
(SNMCMG);  
 A combat air and air-support component.  
 Special Operations Forces.  
 A chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence task 
force.  
Before use, the force will be tailored (adjusted in size and capability) to match 
the demands of any specific operation to which it is committed.
121
 
The NRF was first announced at the Prague Summit in 2002, General James 
Jones described the NRF in this way, " NATO will no longer have the large, 
massed units that were necessary for the Cold War, but will have agile and 
capable forces at Graduated Readiness levels that will better prepare the 
Alliance to meet any threat that it is likely to face in this 21st century."
122
 The 
capabilities of this new force were tested in a number of major high profile 
exercises, the most prominent being Steadfast Jaguar in 2006. Steadfast Jaguar 
was conducted on the Cape Verde Islands in June of 2006 and was specifically 
chosen due to the challenging location. With the success of this demonstration, 
the NRF was subsequently deployed in a number of theatres. Since then, 
NATO has “agreed that the NRF will be at the core of the Connected Forces 
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Initiative in order to maintain NATO’s readiness and combat-effectiveness".123 
This was an important step, as it shows that NATO is constantly analysing 
how the NRF can be adapted and changed to better suit the current geopolitical 
climate.  
As with the Battlegroup, the NRF is formed on a rotational basis of 12-month 
periods for which NATO members provide resources and personnel; this 
rotational aspect of the NRF, and Battlegroup initiative, provides great 
flexibility and allows the States to make contributions in line with their own 
strategic interests. It must be stressed here that as with the Battlegroup 
strategy, this aspect seems reasonable on paper; however, the reality is that 
only a few Member States have the operational capacity to actually contribute. 
Nevertheless the way the NRF is generated and composed has been adjusted 
twice, in 2008 and 2010. This was to provide a more flexible approach to force 
generation, thereby facilitating force contributions which were being hampered 
by the enduring high operational tempo arising from Iraq, Afghanistan and 
other missions. To further support force generation, Allies have set themselves 
voluntary national targets for force contributions.
124
 
Perhaps the greatest strength that the NRF provides is that it is a very visible 
mechanism, and is both a great deterrent to would be aggressors and also a 
very visible assurance to NATO members and allies. This visibility has been 
displayed on a number of occasions such as in the Olympic Games in Athens 
and in disaster relief in both Pakistan and also in the US after Hurricane 
Katrina. In response to the unrest and conflict in Ukraine, NATO acted and 
created the VJTF. The VJTF was established at the Wales Summit in 
September of 2014 and is designed to further increase the speed at which 
NATO can react to events on its borders.   
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SECTION TWO: Analysis. 
This section has explored the very complex realities that exist within NATO 
and how these have impacted the relationship between the EU, the US and the 
Member States. This information allows us to analyse what is on the slate, or 
the slates, of the concerned parties and how these slates impact the EU drive 
towards military integration. To begin with we will analyse the role that 
NATO plays on the EU’s slate.  
NATO slate. 
NATO, much like the EU, is a product of post-war Europe and thus any 
Constructivist analysis must begin here. As explored earlier in this section, 
NATO was constructed to guarantee the peace of Europe by countering threats 
emanating from the looming power of the Soviet bloc. As Weldes argues, 
“national interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of 
the intersubjective and culturally established meanings with which the world… 
and the place of the state in it is understood”.125 From a Constructivist 
perspective then, the national interests of NATO were established and 
grounded upon the threat of a perceived Soviet invasion. This construct 
determined that NATO, right from its inception, was designed to counter a 
regular military invasion with large scale armed forces and thus needed to 
establish a complex hierarchy. This hierarchy remains in play to this day, 
despite the fact that no Soviet invasion ever occurred and that the threats faced 
by NATO today are not from a national military, but rather from non-state 
actors such as ISIS. The effect that this hierarchy has played on the EU’s slate 
will be thoroughly explored in the next section, however it is important to 
briefly mention here that the hierarchical structure of NATO and the way in 
which the EU has attempted to construct its own independent military seem to 
have a correlation in that the actions undertaken by NATO at a command and 
control level are imitated by the EU and its predecessors.   
When analysing the hierarchy of NATO one cannot escape the role that the US 
and the UK have played in this. As this section has discussed in great detail, 
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the US and its UK partner have been at the forefront of NATO since its 
inception, so much so that the French government at one stage referred to 
NATO decisions as ‘stitched up deals’. This attitude by the French can be 
understood from a Constructivist perspective as being a result of  as Weldes 
argues, “specific identities (which) are created when social relations are 
depicted, different representations of the world entail different identities, 
which in turn carry with them different ways of functioning in the world . . . 
and make possible different interests”.126 This position which Weldes argues is 
one of the dual mechanisms from which national interests are formed, in this 
case interpellation. From a Constructivist perspective it would appear clear 
that the UK and the US had constructed their own view of the world which 
saw them, and not Europe, as the bedrock of European security, while the 
French viewed NATO as nothing more than an Anglo-American alliance 
designed to steer Europe in a direction antagonistic to its own constructed 
identity. This identity driven division within NATO has played a considerable 
role in the policy formulations of not only the three members mentioned here, 
but also the wider EU. Weldes argues that, “State officials do not approach 
international politics with a blank slate on to which meanings are written only 
as a result of interactions among states”.127 Weldes’ position is clearly 
exemplified in the way these three actors have interacted with each other and 
more importantly the impact that these interactions have played within the 
largest European military alliance in history. For decades, the hostility 
between the Anglo-Americans and the French fuelled the fires of discontent 
and thus produced a slate for all parties of distrust and in many cases 
resentment. As is common knowledge, in the Anglosphere world the French 
military are held in little regard and are seen as cowards. This widespread 
disdain is a clear example of just how the slate impacts not only the elites, but 
also the general public. 
One cannot underestimate the power of the slate which informs the decisions 
made by elite. It was only in 2009 that the French returned to NATO after 
many decades of absence following De Gaulle’s decision to withdraw from 
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NATO’s integrated military command and pursue its own independent military 
action. This independent action is seen today when French troops operate 
independently from both the EU and NATO in operations such as the 
paratrooper attack on Boko Haram in 2015. The split has been referred to in 
this paper many times and we have seen that it has not just been limited to 
NATO operations but has in fact played a major role in shaping the integration 
debate since its inception; this issue will be thoroughly examined in the 
Section Three.   
In Section One, the term ‘multiple personality disorder’ was briefly employed 
to describe European and NATO actions undertaken on the global scene; while 
on the surface, it would appear that the relationship between the UK, US and 
France seem to display many clear ‘symptoms’, it would be misleading to 
make this assumption too sweepingly. It would a mistake because the reality is 
somewhat more complex. Within the context of NATO, we recall that France 
was not a member for many decades; so despite the fact that all parties’ slates 
were heavily affected by the antagonism, this cannot simply be considered a 
case of multiple personality disorder as France was not a member of the 
NATO ‘body’ at all. Thus in this context, France was not a competing 
personality indwelling the body but rather an opponent in a separate, but 
closely related, body. However in relation to the integration of Europe’s 
military, France was and is a member of that body and its dislocation is of 
great concern. Whatever the ‘diagnosis’, nothing seems to indicate an effective 
operational European integration taking place in the foreseeable future.  
Returning once more to the Anglo-American leadership, the importance of this 
partnership within NATO cannot be stressed enough; as stated earlier within 
this section, at the Lisbon Summit in 2010 the importance of a Euro-Atlantic 
alliance was understood to be vital to the security of Europe. The statements 
made in this regard can be forcefully argued to have been derived directly 
from Member States’ own slates; as highlighted earlier in this section, only a 
handful of the EU Member States actually meet the required two percent of 
GDP to be a Member of NATO and yet they still benefit from being NATO 
members. This reality, in and of itself, is an important aspect to bear in mind 
when understanding the EU’s slate. For decades, the slate has been constructed 
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upon the knowledge that the US will intervene in a crisis on the European 
continent; this knowledge has been backed up on a number of occasions such 
as in the Balkans where Europe was incapable of acting independently and 
required the Clinton government to intervene, and more recently in Libya. 
Following the Lisbon Treaty, violence in Libya erupted. Europe’s slate had 
just undergone a considerable shakeup. As stated earlier in this section, Lisbon 
was a perceived massive stepping stone in the quest to address a number of 
concerns, especially in light of the long history between Europe and NATO. 
One of the foundational statements made as noted prior in this thesis was “We 
have adopted a new Strategic Concept that lays out our vision for the Alliance 
for the next decade: (sic) able to defend its members against the full range of 
threats; capable of managing even the most challenging crises”. The resolve of 
this vision would soon be tested in full view of the world in Libya. The Libyan 
intervention was from the beginning a US and UK led initiative; as pointed out 
earlier, many European nations were in support of this operation and yet few 
were able to participate, and those that were able to participate, were only able 
to do so with American leadership and supplies. This reality goes back to the 
points made earlier concerning American hierarchy within NATO and is a 
classic example of Weldes’ position which argues in relation to the importance 
of linguistic resources “simultaneously given an identity; . . . with 
characteristics which are sometimes precise and certain, at other times vague 
and unsettled . . . their importance lies not in their accuracy, but in their 
provision of warranting conditions”.128 The importance of Weldes’ words here 
is that the linguistic resource employed to write on one’s slate does not 
actually have to be correct in a factual sense. Only months prior, the EU had 
boldly claimed that they had a new strategic concept which could deal with 
any threat and yet this boastful new world conquering strategy struggled 
against a third world dictator in a sparsely populated country on Europe’s 
doorstep.  
When analysing the Libyan debacle from a Constructivist perspective, one can 
clearly see that while an updated slate was constructed at Lisbon, it was not 
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long before this slate was revealed to be completely overly ambitious. It also 
revealed that the writing on the US slate concerning many of its ‘partners’ in 
Europe was not at all unfounded; that is that the Europeans do not take defence 
seriously and are incapable of acting independently.  
While Section Two has analysed how NATO has impacted European 
integration, the next section will discuss how Europe has attempted to create 
its own independent European military integration and just how the American 
hierarchy within NATO has impacted this process.  
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SECTION THREE: a unified and credible European military force. 
What attempts have been made to construct this? 
The statements made and the positions established in the previous section are 
not new. Since the foundation of what became the European Union, European 
nations have been crippled by military weakness. In the early post-war years, 
the entire European continent was effectively a pile of rubble following the 
destruction of two world wars; within this context of devastation, military 
debilitation is understandable. This section explores how the EU and its post-
war predecessors have attempted to create a unified and credible European 
military force. 
The first part of this section (3a) will analyse an early forerunner of the 
contemporary notion of an integrated EU military force, the Pleven Plan. This 
plan was formulated by the French in October of 1950 and aimed to combine 
military units from the Member States into an integrated European army under 
the direction of the council of Member States’ ministers. The Pleven Plan 
envisaged a European Defence Community (EDC), which would follow the 
example of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This concept 
meshed nicely within the emerging, still fragile, European identity in which it 
was envisaged that pan-European co-operation in multiple fields would lead to 
peace and prosperity for all. Following the trauma of two world wars within 
the living memory of millions, mutual co-operation and a pan-European 
approach to security was widely accepted at all levels. 
The second section (3b) examines how in the early years of European 
integration, NATO and the United States played a significant role in shaping 
the strategies undertaken by European nations towards defence and how this 
role would impact not only the strategic thinking of the time, but also 
contemporary defence policies and attitudes of the Member States. This 
examination is vital as the early reliance on American leadership for defence 
and the reluctance to create a supranational body that could potentially be in 
competition with NATO was, in the early post-war years and is still to this 
day, seen as a sensitive topic.  
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The third section (3c) focuses on intergovernmental defence strategies 
conducted by Member States, specifically the St Malo declaration made by the 
UK and France. The focus on this treaty gives the reader a clear insight into 
how Member States are approaching both their own and regional security and 
defence; it also shows how these treaties integrate, if at all, with other Member 
States’ strategies and also the CSDP and other EU institutions. 
The fourth (3d) section analyses what institutional bodies and strategies exist 
within the EU. The main focus of this section will be the EU Battle Groups 
strategy and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This focus 
allows us to analyse how contemporary EU institutional attitudes and 
strategies are constructed towards defence and security, and how these 
strategies relate to those of the Member States.  
The final section (3e) seeks to address the question of why the EU Battle 
Groups’ strategy, and other strategies and declarations such as the Helsinki 
Headline Goal, not only remain unmet, but appeared to have been ignored all 
together. This section addresses the question in the context of contemporary 
conflicts and how both the EU, including its Member States and the US have 
acted. These clearly fit the prerogatives of the strategies and declarations made 
by the EU and yet both have been resoundingly ignored by the EU as a whole; 
in fact, it has been left to the individual Member States to formulate their own 
positions outside of a coherent EU response. What then do these examples 
mean for the EU as a credible security actor; and more importantly for this 
thesis, what do these examples mean for EU military integration?  
Section 3a: the Pleven Plan. 
Following the defeat of the Axis powers, Europe lay in ruins; tens of millions 
had died, national infrastructure on the continent lay in ruins and the horrors of 
the Holocaust were beginning to be revealed. The two world wars had 
effectively eviscerated Europe’s manpower and resolve to pursue military 
adventurism; this widespread weakness however needed to be addressed as the 
new threat rising in the East banished any hope of peace. The threat from the 
East led Europe, under American leadership, to construct the NATO alliance 
as outlined in the previous section; at the same time however, the first tentative 
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steps towards an integrated European military force were being taken by the 
French. On the 24
th
 of October 1950, French Defence Minister René Pleven 
proposed to establish a European Defence Community; his proposal would 
come to be known the Pleven Plan.
129
 This plan took its inspiration from 
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman’s strategy of the European Coal and 
Steel Community. The ECSC was formalised after the Treaty of Paris in 1951; 
it was signed by West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg with the aim of creating a common market for coal and steel 
among the Member States. This strategy was vital as in the early post-war 
period the massive reconstruction program underway on the continent meant 
that both these materials were in high demand. It was hoped that through 
ECSC integration to “make war not only unthinkable but materially 
impossible”.130 Schuman’s aspiration can be argued to lie at the heart of the 
proposed Pleven Plan.  
The Pleven Plan envisaged the creation of a European Defence Community 
that would act in a similar manner to the ECSC. The plan would see the 
creation of a European Army under the command of a European Defence 
Minister who would answer to EDC, and they in turn would be accountable to 
the European Parliament.
131
  This force would be funded by a common budget 
which would include an armament and equipment procurement program; it is 
interesting to note that from the very earliest inception of this strategy, it was 
proposed that any potential European force would be placed at the disposal of 
the Atlantic Treaty and would operate in accordance with the mandates and 
strategies outlined under the treaty
132
. The concept of collective security was 
gaining traction at this period in history; the Western response to the Korean 
War was being hailed as a success, as stated in the opening remarks made by 
Pleven in his address to the National Assembly on the 24
th
 of October 1950. 
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"Ladies and gentlemen, the ideal of collective security has just achieved a 
victory in Korea which marks an historic advance in the efforts of the free 
nations to create in the world conditions of security such as to discourage any 
aggressive designs”.133 
The Pleven Plan not only sought to bring together soldiers of the Member 
States acting together for common goals, but also to take these national 
soldiers and “achieve a complete fusion of the human and material elements 
which make it up under a single European political and military authority”.134 
This army would be considered a truly European force, answerable only to the 
European Parliament and not to any Member State; or would it? To answer 
this question it is necessary to briefly outline the mechanics of how this 
proposed European army would work. At the senior level, a Minister of 
Defence would be appointed by the participating governments and would 
possess responsibilities set out by the European Assembly. The powers vested 
in this position would be similar to that of a national defence minister, such as 
implementing directives from the council and acting as a channel between the 
European Community and outside nations. It was understood that this minister 
would operate within a common European budget and would be responsible 
for overseeing the implementation of existing international obligations and the 
negotiations of new engagements on the basis of those received by the Council 
of Ministers.
135
 As stated previously, the Minister would also hold the 
responsibility of pursuing an armaments and equipment program. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the Minister would be responsible for obtaining 
from the Member States the “contingents, the equipment, the armaments, and 
the supplies due from each state to the common army”136 
It is interesting to recall at this juncture that individual nations would still 
possess their own independent militaries alongside those that were to be 
committed to the European army, “participating states which currently have 
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national forces at their disposal would retain their own authority so far as 
concerned that part of their existing forces which was not integrated by them 
into the European army”.137 This fact is interesting when considered alongside 
the following statement, 
“Conversely, the European Minister of Defence might with the authorization 
of the Council of Ministers, place at the disposal of a participating government 
a part of its national forces comprised in the European force, for the purpose 
of meeting requirements other than those of common defence.”138 
This statement would seem to indicate that, with the approval of the Council of 
Ministers, the European Army could potentially be used by national 
governments to suit their own agendas, even those that may potentially run 
counter to the notion of common defence. An example of this could be the 
deployment of this army by the French in Indochina or North Africa. This 
reality, especially in the post-war period which saw the old Colonial powers 
lose vast areas of their empires to nationalist uprisings, would make any 
potential pan-European army a political bargaining tool to be employed by the 
most powerful countries such as France. To expand, as the European military 
is dependent on contributions from Member States, a nation such as France 
could withhold or withdraw its forces and funding if its demands were not 
meet and by so doing nullify any potential for a credible European army. 
While this may seem unlikely, we must remember that France withdrew from 
NATO for a number of decades over what it saw as alliance where “the British 
and Americans stitched up deals” and thus seriously weakened the European 
component of NATO. Would a similar reaction have occurred if Member 
States refused to assist France in its costly and unsuccessful wars in Asia and 
Africa? Any answer to this question is of course purely speculative, but it does 
highlight the vulnerabilities of any alliance which allows the potential usage of 
European troops to further the geostrategic goals of a single member.    
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The hypothetical question above, while simply a theoretical possibility, needs 
to be grounded upon the proposed relationship that the EDC was intended to 
have with NATO. It must be stressed that the Pleven Plan and subsequent 
EDC was never intended to be a purely independent force structure; it was 
always to be strongly related to the “Contractual Agreements” of Bonn, 
otherwise known as the 1952 Treaty on Germany,
139
 which sought to provide 
the Federal Government of West Germany “full power over its domestic and 
foreign affairs".
140
 While many commentators link the Pleven Plan and EDC 
with the ECSC, the fact remains that the EDC was not to remain autonomous, 
but was in fact to be closely linked to NATO. While statement made by the 
French Defence Minister regarding the Pleven Plan stressed the importance of 
the role that a proposed European Defence Minister would play, we must 
realise that any European force would have come under the power of the 
NATO Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, who was an American. 
This would have meant that if the Pleven Plan had come to fruition, the first 
contemporary European military would ultimately have answered to an 
American. The American Journal of International Law states that the Supreme 
NATO Commander would be “empowered to satisfy himself that the 
European Defence Forces are organised, equipped, trained . . . (so) they are 
ready for use, at the disposal of the Supreme NATO Commander”.141 The 
author goes further and outlines that during a time of war that the EDC will be 
subservient to NATO command.  
This role that NATO would have played if the Pleven Plan had been initiated 
poses yet more questions about the notion that this would have been a truly 
European army. With the reality that the EDC would be under the authority of 
NATO command and the fact that NATO was dominated by the United States 
and UK, neither of whom were members of the fledgling European 
Community, we ask three important questions; firstly, could this European 
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military have been considered anything more than a tool to be utilised by non-
Member States? Secondly, with French attitudes towards NATO progressively 
becoming more strained, how could this proposed plan have been effectively 
implemented when the EDC would have been effectively led by two non-
Member States from which the French were progressively moving away in 
terms of trust and cooperation? Thirdly, what role would West Germany have 
played in this pan-European force? It is important to remember that just five 
years prior to the first proposal of the Pleven Plan, the Wehrmacht had 
conducted a brutal occupation in the Member States of the proposed European 
army. This question, unlike the previous two, can be answered with a degree 
of legitimacy that does not rely on speculation. 
The question of what to do with post-war Germany was a pressing issue, no 
more than in the realm of defence. Many European nations had fought two 
world wars with Germany in the space of only half a century. Despite this 
difficult relationship with Germany, Europe and the US knew that in order to 
ensure the security of post-war Europe from the looming threat of 
Communism, West Germany must be included. While one can see the value of 
including West Germany in the ECSC, it is an entirely different matter to 
include them militarily. While today the crimes of the Wehrmacht and SS have 
grown stale in the collective memory of many in the West, throughout the 
early years of the 1950s, the crimes were still very present in the collective 
psyche of Europe and also manifest in the widespread physical devastation. 
Yet despite this, to counter the new threat rising from Stalin’s Russia, it was 
considered that West Germany must be included in defence.  
The German question, in regards to defence, had two potential paths to 
resolution; first, the path of the Bonn Agreement or secondly, the path of the 
Pleven Plan. It is interesting to note that the French played a considerable role 
in the pursuit of both these strategies.  On the 26th of May 1952, The Allied-
German Contractual Agreement was signed in Bonn; the purpose of this treaty, 
as stated earlier, was to provide the Federal Republic full power to oversee its 
domestic and foreign affairs once the EDC came into effect.
142
 This position 
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understandably caused many nations to question the wisdom of the policy 
direction, none more so than the French. This opposition can be understood to 
be a key reason why the French wanted to create a European army in which 
German forces could participate, but with the key caveat that there would be 
no West German national army. This position however, was strongly 
challenged by the British. The UK’s attitude towards the rearmament of 
Germany was strongly grounded in a NATO approach and in fact the UK’s 
approach to a combined European army followed a similar vein. On the 29
th
 of 
November 1950, Anthony Eden, the Conservative Foreign Secretary, stated 
that he had “no time” for a European army and that “Europe is not enough, it is 
not big enough” and instead advocated for an ‘Atlantic Confederate Force’ 
under NATO command;
143
 as a consequence, the British strongly countered 
not only French proposals for the rearmament of Germany through the Pleven 
Plan, but the Pleven plan in its entirety. It is interesting however that despite 
the UK’s unwillingness to support or merge its forces with any potential 
European army, the UK was still willing to support the creation of one. It is 
important to add that while the UK was not even a member of the proposed 
EDC, it could still wield such significant influence over members; thus the 
notion that the EDC and Pleven Plan would for the foreseeable future be 
subservient to NATO is reinforced.  
The issue of West Germany was but one of many problems which ultimately 
caused the downfall of the Pleven Plan and the EDC; it is thought provoking to 
observe that despite the significant role that the French played in the initial 
stages of promoting these concepts it was the French Parliament, specifically 
the Gaullists, who ended any hopes of seeing a combined European military in 
the mid-20
th
 Century.  It is one of history’s many conundrums that a French 
strategy to create a supranational European army would fail due to fears from 
French Government officials that France would lose too much of its own 
sovereignty in the process; and thus, a French strategic plan would fail to be 
ratified by the French Parliament. It must be stressed here nevertheless that the 
failure of the EDC and Pleven Plan was not just due to the French Parliament; 
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the death of Stalin and the unwillingness of the UK to enter into any such 
European army led many to question the validity of a European army in 
conjunction with NATO.  
Section 3b: US influence in European security decisions. 
The failure of the Pleven Plan as outlined above can be understood to have 
resulted from multiple factors which culminated with the French Government 
voting its demise. The prospect of an independent European force, while 
intriguing and attractive to a number of European leaders, would ultimately 
fail due to the reliance on and leadership of the United States in post-war 
Europe and also because the UK was more closely related to the US than it 
was to its European neighbours. Both these realities are vital to understand if 
we are to explore the foundation for contemporary security thinking in Europe. 
It is quite understandable that the topic of American leadership both in the past 
and in contemporary Europe was and remains a sensitive topic; Paschal 
Bruckner puts it this way, “Neither France, nor Italy, nor Germany could 
forgive America for having liberated them from the Nazi and fascist yokes.... 
The little American cousin had surpassed her European elders in vigour, power 
and creativity. It is hard to forgive assistance when it shows up such 
weakness”.144 And yet, one cannot ignore this issue. Following the war and the 
destruction to both civil and military power, Western Europe was heavily 
dependent on an American guarantee for defence. Western Europe was in no 
position to counter the Soviet aggression on its borders without a considerable 
number of American troops stationed throughout Western Europe. The signing 
of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty cemented both US leadership and a 
dependence on US military resources in the region for many decades to come. 
It is important to recall that it was Western European nations who pushed for 
American leadership and the continued presence of a vast number of US 
personnel within Western Europe. In contrast, the US had initially expected 
Western European countries to progressively take control of their own security 
and by so doing free up large numbers of its own military thus enabling the US 
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to avoid spending a considerable amount of its defence budget each year being 
the sole credible security actor in the region.
145
 This US desire for Western 
Europe to undertake greater responsibility was undermined by the on-going 
escalation of conflict between the East and West, and in particular the Korean 
War. As such, the escalation in conflict saw the upgrade of the 1949 treaty to 
what we now know as NATO.  
The formation of NATO changed the security landscape of Europe forever. 
This alliance, which was examined in the previous section, witnessed the first 
integration of European armed forces in peace time for many years; however, 
it also contained a considerable American presence. One cannot underestimate 
the role that the US played in these early years of NATO, and in fact the role it 
plays even today. This substantial American presence was not just limited to 
significant quantities of troops but also, and most importantly, it brought with 
it leadership. Every single NATO Supreme Allied   Commander has been an 
American; this fact is due to the requirement that this role must be filled by a 
member of the US military who is either a four-star general or admiral. This 
continuation of American leadership in NATO speaks volumes about the way 
that arguably not only the US but also wider Europe views its role to be in 
both NATO and collective European security. This situation is further 
highlighted when we examine the nationalities of the Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander; there has never once been a French deputy or in fact a deputy 
from any other nation apart from the UK and Germany, with the UK playing 
the dominant role. With these two facts alone, it is no wonder that the French 
for many decades viewed NATO as being a club where the US and UK 
“stitched up deals”. American leadership though derives once again from the 
early years of post-war Europe. 
The overarching and foundational US leadership in Europe in the early years 
effectively enabled the US to manage large aspects of what could be 
considered uniquely European affairs. This dependency of Western Europe on 
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the US greatly restricted Western European nations’ national and foreign 
policies and thus significantly influenced the way in which European defence 
integration was conducted.
146
 As one author puts it, “practically every proposal 
was, and still is, reviewed (by) . . . “What do the Americans think” test”.147 
This statement clearly highlights the great importance that the US plays both 
today and in the past. With this reality, it is little wonder that French plans for 
European military integration, that went contrary to the wishes of the US and 
UK, ultimately failed; the US was just too indispensable to defence for Europe 
to ignore its interests. As such, any attempt by European nations to integrate 
any initiatives towards collective defence not only had to satisfy Member 
States’ political wills, but most importantly the might of Washington. Within 
this reality, the French position regarding the Pleven Plan and its perceived 
loss of sovereignty and dignity becomes understandable. The relationship 
between France and the US had for many years been at best cold, and thus 
French anxiety over loss of sovereignty and the tarnishing of national glory are 
justifiable. This is particularly so when considering that if a united European 
army had been formed, the US would have played an immense role in all 
aspects of not only French but all European national economies and foreign 
policies. This rather substantial claim can be supported by reference to the 
nature of modern warfare; any person interested in politics will have at some 
stage come across the term, ‘Military Industrial Complex’ (MIC). This term 
refers to the realities of industrialised warfare; for example, coal and steel 
production would be considered part of the MIC as they can be used for 
military purposes, and are in fact vital to successful campaigns. Hence, we can 
understand the French reluctance to be subsumed into an MIC controlled by 
the United States. 
This reality of US ubiquity and dominance would therefore constitute a great 
intrusion to all aspects of the emerging European Union. The newly formed 
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ECSC would have theoretically come under partial control of the US if the 
creation of a combined European army of the Pleven Plan had occurred. This 
statement might seem a little alarmist, but when we consider a few realities of 
industrialised warfare it becomes a more substantive claim. If the Pleven Plan 
had been initiated, the subsequent leadership position that the US would have 
held due to its role in NATO and the subservience of the Pleven Plan to NATO 
command would have allowed the US to either directly or indirectly push 
policies on domestic coal and steel production along with other manufacturing 
sectors to align with its own strategic principles and not those of the host 
nations. The US would have theoretically been able to do this due to the 
proposal for a combined European armaments program, something which 
requires coal, steel and manufacturing. As this armaments program would 
have ultimately fallen under a NATO Allied Supreme Commander, an 
American not a European would have wielded considerable power in both 
military and civil policies in multiple European countries. This reality in the 
early post-war period underlies why no combined European army was ever 
constructed, and at the same time highlights the considerable role that the US 
played in post-war Europe. 
The role that the US has played within European security cannot be denied; it 
was the US and not Europe that provided the bulk of the forces during the 
Cold War and today, it is the US and not Europe that still provides the bulk of 
the forces in ‘European’ actions. As mentioned in the previous section, it was 
the US and not the EU who led the intervention in Libya, it was also the US 
and not Europe who led the air strikes and intervention against Serbia, a nation 
that is within geographic Europe. Whether one agrees with American foreign 
policy or not is irrelevant, the fact remains that as in the past Europe is still 
dependent upon American leadership and resourcing when conducting large 
scale military operations. This attachment can be seen to have originated in the 
early vulnerability of the post-war period and has continued on to the present 
day.  
European dependency however is beginning to face a major disruption; as 
China grows in the East, the US is now moving its attention to Asia and the 
Pacific. As noted in the previous section, the US is cutting its military abilities 
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considerably to the point that, as noted in Section Two, it will be only able to 
operate on a large scale in one conflict zone. This new strategic view of the US 
known as the ‘Pivot’ would identify exactly what the US views as comprising 
its own strategic interests. It is of extreme importance that this Pivot is 
occurring at the same time as instability in Europe’s geographic 
neighbourhood is exploding, whether that instability be the Islamic State or 
events in Ukraine or North Africa. This US Pivot will greatly affect future 
European defence integration.  
Section 3c: Intergovernmental defence strategies. 
The failure to implement a common army or indeed a common foreign policy 
in the 1950s would set off a cascade of ramifications that are still felt today. 
The indecision and political wrangling surrounding both the notion of defence 
and the best way to achieve it led to the position that any discussion towards 
military integration was now taboo. These political sensibilities would 
influence the direction that Europe would take in a very significant manner; in 
the 1970s, when the European Community initiated the first informal 
cooperation in regards to a common foreign policy within the framework of 
the European Political Cooperation (EPC), it was made manifestly clear that 
the direction that any common foreign policy would take would be through 
‘civilian power’.148 However, the fact remained that despite this pledge of 
being an exclusively ‘civilian power’ the European Community lacked any 
credible crisis management instruments with which to implement this ‘civilian 
power’. The notion of foreign policy through civilian power was soon 
challenged by the realities of what a number of commentators labelled an “un-
civil world”. Following the declaration in the 1970s, the world witnessed 
multiple conflicts flaring up throughout the globe; whether in Asia, Africa or 
the Middle East, the European Community was unable to respond with any 
form of credibility or effectiveness in any of these regions which desperately 
needed the intervention of a security actor. It is important to note at this point 
that there are completely valid and even compelling arguments as to why 
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Europe should not have intervened in some of these regions; further, it is not 
the purpose of this thesis to make a moral argument about the validity of 
foreign intervention per se. However, when the bloodshed and violence is 
occurring on the border of the European Community and is in fact part of 
Europe, Yugoslavia, this becomes an entirely different matter.  
The military impotence displayed by Europe to the world was a wakeup call, 
and the fact that neither NATO nor Washington was willing to get involved in 
the early stages effectively neutralised any form of European response; as 
established earlier in several places, Europe has been consistently unable to 
operate in any theatre without US support. Not until tens of thousands of 
civilians had died did NATO act, and even then it was once again an American 
led coalition dealing with once again a European aggressor. The conflict in 
Yugoslavia and other areas made it impossible for the Member States to 
continue to ignore the military dimensions of security when negotiating the 
new Treaty of Maastricht and the new Common Foreign and Defence Policy 
(CFDP). However even as the impotence of Europe as a security actor on the 
global stage had been broadcast all over the world, there still existed divisions 
and uncertainties within Europe about how to proceed. 
The Maastricht Treaty was signed on the 7
th
 of February 1992 and covered a 
wide range of areas. One of the milestones of this treaty was that it addressed 
the need to create a common foreign policy within the community, “to 
implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual 
framing of a common defence policy”.149 This statement plainly indicates that 
for the first time in many decades, Europe would pursue a credible common 
foreign and defence policy and also the ability to act as an effective global 
security player. This creation of the CFDP was, in the view of the treaty, an 
important way of promoting and affirming the identity of Europe on the global 
scene. Article B clearly states that the Union is “to assert its identity on the 
international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common 
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foreign and security policy”.150 This new willingness to be active on the global 
scene as a credible international security actor is outlined in “Title V 
Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy”.  
Title V’s objectives focus on safeguarding the common values, interests and 
independence of the Union; strengthening peace at both the regional and 
international level in accordance with the principles of both the UN Charter 
and the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and Paris Charter; the promotion 
of international cooperation; and finally, the promotion of democracy and 
human rights globally.
151
 These stated objectives were then to be pursued by 
two main strategic thrusts; firstly, the establishment of systematic cooperation 
between Member States and then, the gradual implementation, in accordance 
with the treaty, of joint action in areas in which Member states have shared 
interests. These objectives would appear to be reasonable to pursue, and if 
successfully implemented could be understood as laying the groundwork for 
an integrated and credible military force; as such, it is important to analyse in 
greater detail how these objectives were to be pursued. 
To begin with we will analyse the first strategic plan, “establishing systematic 
co-operation between Member States in the conduct of policy, in accordance 
with Article J.2”.152 Article J.2 has three primary points, first that Member 
States will consult and inform each other within the Council on foreign and 
security policy which is deemed to be of general interest with the aim of 
ensuring a more unified approach to the matter at hand. Secondly, whenever 
the Council deems it necessary it shall define a common position which the 
Member States will conform to; and thirdly, Member States will coordinate 
their actions with other international bodies.
153
  These strategies were to be 
then taken in accordance with the strategies laid out in the second aspect of the 
pursuit of the objectives, “by gradually implementing, in accordance with 
Article J.3, joint action in the areas in which the Member States have 
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important interests in common”.154 Article J.3 goes into great detail in regards 
to the implementation on how any joint action would proceed. To summarise, 
the Council would hold the power to decide what matters would be decided to 
be ‘joint actions’. This section also includes how these joint actions would be 
authorised and by what manner they would be decided upon; for example, 
when the Council is required to act by a qualified majority the article outlines 
the steps and majorities that need to be established before the joint action can 
be undertaken. It is interesting to note that this section enables Member States 
to act alone if the situation makes it imperative to act; the Member State 
merely needs to inform the Council on any such action.  
This provision for independent action highlights the underlying and 
fundamental weakness of the Maastricht Treaty in regards to defence and also 
foreshadows the problems inherent in the construction of an integrated 
European military force today; if a Member State wishes to act unilaterally, it 
can do so by merely stating that immediate action is imperative and thus 
pursue its own foreign policy without any regard to the provisions outlined in 
the Treaty. This factor was not alone in the demise of the initial CFSP; once 
again Europe was divided about the best path towards integration. Nations 
such as France and Germany were interested in pursuing a common defence 
approach, other nations who were more predisposed to the Atlantic treaty or 
who were neutral actors were more interested in minimal changes at best. The 
Maastricht Treaty did attempt to alleviate these concerns through section J.4 of 
the Treaty; however, it is clear that nations such as the UK were merely paying 
lip service and making token gestures of support towards a credible common 
security.
155
 To elaborate, while nations like the UK may have given the Treaty 
its support, they had not made available to the EU the resources and 
instruments that it would need in order to achieve its desired role in the world. 
It is little wonder then that after the Balkans had once again spiralled into 
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violence that Europe was once again looking incompetent on the world stage 
as it was unable to operate independently without the US  and thus further 
discredited not only the EU but its new ‘pillar’ the CFSP. 
Section 3(a-c) Analysis. 
Before we proceed further, it is important to analyse the information that has 
been set out thus far in light of the primary focus of this paper, “Can the EU be 
a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member 
States’ militaries’?  
Section 3a focussed on the initial steps that were undertaken within Europe to 
formulate a credible and unified armed forces of Europe. As detailed earlier, 
the main thrust of this strategy occurred under the Pleven Plan and the way in 
which this plan’s initiatives would have worked in conjunction with NATO. 
The underlying factors that prevented the Pleven Plan from being properly 
implemented would clearly appear to be the presence and competing national 
identities of the Member States themselves. This is understandably an 
inflammatory statement; however when we look for reasons for the failure of 
this plan, it is immediately apparent that the internal political ambitions of 
individual Member States; their competing foreign policies; and most 
importantly, the way each state saw itself, both in terms of identity and role; 
and the way in which each state identified who its friends and rivals were 
would appear to have coalesced to seal the fate of the Pleven Plan before it had 
even been announced. Reasons for this apparently inescapable failure can be 
found in multiple aspects of both the Pleven Plan and the wider political 
atmosphere of the day. Perhaps the greatest reason that Pleven failed was that 
it enabled the Member States to possess their own national armies and foreign 
policies while at the same time requiring these same nations to then contribute 
a significant portion of their military resources to a combined European army. 
Further undermining any possible success of the Pleven Plan was the 
byzantine nature of NATO and the fact that the European organisation would 
ultimately come under the control of the United States, if the proposed 
command structure were had been followed through.  In addition to this 
reality, the role that the UK was able to play in influencing the ultimate failure 
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of this plan, despite the fact that the UK was not even a member, shows the 
clear weakness and susceptibility of the proposed alliance to, arguably, foreign 
powers. While taking the position that the UK was a foreign power may be a 
stretch, the point remains that two non-Member States, the US and UK were 
able to successfully discredit and destroy a military integration plan which ran 
counter to their own strategic outlooks with apparent ease. This outside 
meddling was not the only problem, when we consider that the French 
Government voted against the very plan which had been instigated by the 
French Government we see a clear example of the weakness of the integration 
position at this time. 
When we consider these facts in light of the question, “Can the EU be a 
credible international security actor without the integration of the Member 
States’ militaries’, it would be reasonable to state that a combined European 
military in the 1950s would have not been a credible security actor largely due 
to the existence of dissension, distrust and competing national identities along 
with the ability for non-Member States to effectively dismantle the Plan with 
apparent ease. These factors combine to demonstrate, without a shadow of 
doubt, that even if the Pleven Plan had been implemented it would have not 
only failed to act in any form of decisive manner, but would have ultimately 
imploded under pressure from the internal incoherence and division with 
which such an alliance would have been plagued.   
These political machinations can be understood in the context of what was 
happening to the empires of post-war Europe. A number of the nations, such as 
the UK and France, were in the process of rapidly losing large swathes of their 
once global empires in very quick succession; as a consequence, any proposed 
strategy by one of these former colonising powers would have been viewed by 
both internal members and external states with a deal of scepticism and thus 
undermined the credibility of the proposed army on the international scene.  
The role of the United States that has been outlined is undeniable; how then 
does this role influence the thesis question? As stated prior, because Europe 
was and remains unable to act effectively without America, the “what do the 
Americans think test” has always been and still remains pivotal in policy and 
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strategy construction; put very bluntly, little has changed. This American test 
is an incredibly important aspect of any discussion concerning an integrated 
approach to European security. This significant reality, whether viewed as 
positive or negative, is an undeniable fact. The US is the sole remaining 
superpower today and European defence is still underfunded and is still racked 
by competing national identities and ambitions. In reference back to the Pleven 
Plan, it is interesting to note that the Pleven Plan, which called for a combined 
European military, ultimately still placed this military under the leadership of 
the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, an American. This trend has 
continued, as we have seen in previous sections where Europeans have looked 
to the US and also the UK for leadership in contemporary security actions such 
as the Balkans and Libya. This significant US role could even go so far as to 
change the thesis question by adding the caveat “Can the EU be a credible 
international security actor without the integration of the Member States’ 
militaries’ without American leadership?”. 
This hypothetical caveat, while interestingly controversial and valid, is 
extraneous. Our purpose is to understand the key questions surrounding the 
ability for Europe to be seen as an independent security actor which is free to 
act on its own merits and not depend on the leadership of the US. It is 
important to note that the EU has many times declared its intention to work 
with other international bodies and not to operate as a solely independent 
actor; however, this position should not be interpreted to include the inability 
of the EU to act on its own, but simply as a desire to act in a non-unilateral 
manner. 
To conclude the analysis of this section we shall turn our attention to the 
Maastricht Treaty. On the basis of the information provided earlier, it would 
appear that not much changed between the early post-war period Pleven Plan 
through to the Maastricht Treaty in regards to a common defence ability. Once 
again, we witness political corrosion in action by Member States; once again it 
is the UK and France. It seems reasonable to argue that while both these actors 
were happy to adopt the new pan-European ‘we’re all in this together’ 
paradigm at the level of talk-fests, they were in fact still strongly wedded to 
their old colonial identities in which they ‘knew better’ and should be listened 
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to with special attention. Their former identities had provided states like 
France and the UK with power and glory; they now struggled to acknowledge 
that these were slipping from their grasp and that any new global influence 
they might look forward to must be structured differently and be shaped by 
new and challenging constraints. Did these former colonisers really trust their 
new European friends? Did they respect them? Were they willing to work with 
them, or even with each other? It appears not. 
As with the Pleven Plan, this new Maastricht Treaty was solely dependent 
upon Member States providing the European Union with the personnel and 
equipment to conduct ‘EU’ foreign policy, and once again this did not occur. 
In fact it caused the initial stages of the contemporary EU to appear weak and 
inefficient in regards to constructing and implementing a credible foreign 
policy. As with the time period surrounding the Pleven Plan, once again the 
US had to step in and provide leadership to Europe in the Balkans conflict. 
This inability to conduct a credible security response to the conflict in the 
Balkans so soon after the Maastricht Treaty, which as discussed earlier was 
meant to address these considerable short fallings, has been described as 
merely ‘bad timing’ for the EU. This conclusion of ‘bad timing’ however is 
not a satisfactory answer to the realities laid out so far; war is generally never 
‘good timing’ for those it is declared upon or for those who are required to act. 
It is for this very reason that nations and empires for millennia have always 
maintained a credible deterrent to outside aggressors, whether it was a 
professional army like the Roman legions or the man at arms of the Middle 
Ages.   
This lesson appeared to have been lost on continental Europe, who seemed for 
most of the latter half of the 20
th
 Century to be content with a wall of 
American and British forces separating them from the Soviet Union; this was 
with the marked exception of France, which was in the process of pursuing its 
own national defence programs. Therefore it comes as no surprise that 
following the initiation of the Maastricht Treaty, most of Europe was ill 
prepared to conduct a credible and timely response to the violence in the 
Balkans and thus undermines the validity of Europe’s claims of being a serious 
actor, even in its own neighbourhood. Despite officially making steps towards 
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integrating and establishing a credible European defence force, the fact 
remained that despite this much vaunted integration, Europe still could not act 
and once again had to rely on the US to lead them. This recent history 
highlights and reiterates that simply because a Treaty exists and is embellished 
with many ambitious statements regarding defence integration, its mere 
existence does not actually or necessarily contribute to any form of measurable 
improvement and thus potentially requires the core thesis question of this 
paper to be answered in the negative.  
This position while valid is not the last word on European military integration, 
the next section will explore how following the Maastricht Treaty the EU has 
taken steps to address the serious concerns outlined so far in this paper. 
Contemporary Security 
Section 3d. What institutional security bodies and strategies exist within 
the EU? 
The signing of the Treaty of Maastricht set in motion a relative revolution in 
the way the new Europe, which was in the process of being created, would be 
viewed and would view itself. In the space of a very few short years, Europe 
had gone from eschewing any form of common military integration to signing 
the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty can be considered one of the first 
major stepping stones in the quest for Europe to break the polarization in 
regards to defence in which it had been gripped for nearly half a century, that 
being the conflict over whether European military integration should occur as 
an Atlantic solidarity strategy or a purely European initiative. While the 
immediate aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty and the savage conflicts that 
erupted in the Balkans once again showed the incompetence of any European 
response, the intriguing outcome of this apparent incompetence was for a 
renewed push for greater European integration from two unlikely allies. 
Europe’s impotence in Kosovo led to the realisation amongst many European 
nations that something needed to be done, and done quickly. The primary 
drivers of this new view were the United Kingdom and France, two nations 
who had been ‘at logger-heads’ for decades over how European military 
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integration should occur. Ongoing high level dialogue between the Franco-
British governments led to the Saint-Malo Declaration which provided the 
political basis for the establishment of the contemporary CSDP. It is important 
to note that many commentators have labelled this declaration as “less (of) a 
shared vision than a compromise between two opposing views on European 
security”.156 This is an important statement to consider as it once again shows 
the fragility that is evident within the European Union towards any form of 
military and foreign policy integration.  
The Saint-Malo Declaration was made on the 4
th
 of December 1998; this 
declaration was the outcome of an important Franco-British summit that, 
arguably, for the first time received agreement from both the British and 
French on how Europe could move towards an effective common security 
policy. The declaration stated that “The European Union needs to be in a 
position to play its full role on the international stage” and that the “Union 
must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military 
forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to 
respond to international crises”.157 These statements seem to indicate a strong 
commitment by both parties to the creation of an independent European 
military free from the political will of the Member States, as laid out in the 
Pleven Plan. It is interesting to note however that the declaration does not end 
there and includes a rather interesting reference,  
“In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the 
European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in 
world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective 
obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a 
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modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective 
defence of its members.”158  
This emphatic statement concerning European commitments to NATO seems 
to be quite divisive when we consider the era in which it was made. It is 
important to remember that at the time of this declaration France still held a 
rather hostile view of NATO and one cannot help but think that the inclusion 
of this statement was a reflection of purely British sentiment towards NATO 
and also an expression of Britain’s persuasive powers; and, to a certain extent, 
it question the strength of the two nations’ commitment to upholding this 
declaration. This concern is further reinforced in the statement by the inclusion 
of two sentences; first, “The reinforcement of European solidarity must take 
into account the various positions of European states” and secondly, “The 
different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected”.159 
These two statements would appear to be intentionally designed to address the 
deeply ingrained division between the parties, and yet the declaration gives no 
clear mandate as to how such differences should be resolved. This situation is 
further complicated when we further analyse the NATO aspect of this speech,  
the declaration states, “the Union must be given appropriate structures and a 
capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for 
relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary (NATO) duplication”.160 In 
sum therefore, this declaration can be understood as being intended to create a 
European military capability in conjunction with Member States’ contributions 
to NATO without any duplication. However, the question of how the dual 
requirements for independence and avoidance of duplication would be 
implemented is puzzling; if Europe were to create a military force independent 
from NATO; its very existence would necessarily entail the duplication of 
multiple aspects of the NATO command and control mechanisms. This factor 
is further complicated by, as mentioned prior, France’s less than positive 
attitude towards NATO at this time.     
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Despite these concerns, this Declaration showed that regardless of the 
obstacles of conflicting points of view, rival ambitions and competing national 
narratives, at least in theory, a credible European military force could be 
established. However as with the Pleven Plan, the Saint-Malo Declaration 
requires the EU to be dependent upon individual Member States to provide the 
troops and equipment for any potential EU operation, and in this way the real 
power still lay in the hands of each Member State and not with the EU 
institutional bodies that would be responsible for implementing any EU 
strategy. This is an important point when we consider the question of this 
thesis, “Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the 
integration of the Member States’ militaries’. As with the Pleven Plan, the 
Saint-Malo Declaration’s proposed military is utterly dependent upon Member 
States’ contributions and goodwill; in other words, Saint-Malo envisages an 
integrated and dependant European military, rather than one that, while 
integrated, is actually independent in that it is not beholden to Member States 
to provide the raw materials and personnel for its existence and operational 
effectiveness. While this insistence on integration with dependence continues, 
there can never exist a credible European military due to the fact that every 
time this proposed military wants to act it must first be staffed and equipped 
by not only willing but also capable Member States.  
Lisbon Treaty. 
This continued dependence upon Member States to provide prompt military 
assets to any proposed European operation was a great ‘thorn in the side’ of 
potential European military intervention; how then could this problem be 
ameliorated?  
The attempt to answer this important question came with the signing of the 
Lisbon Treaty on the 13 December 2007 and entered into force on the 1 
December 2009. The Lisbon Treaty addressed a wide range of issues including 
giving more power to the Parliament and the increased importance of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a position 
that was created in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Finally, the Treaty also laid the 
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groundwork for the creation of the European External Action Service in 2010 
and the CSDP. 
The primary focus of the Lisbon Treaty was to "complete the process started 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam and by the Treaty of Nice with a view to 
enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and to 
improving the coherence of its action".
161
 This opening declaration showed the 
apparent willingness of the EU to address many of the on-going issues within 
the Union, none more so than those found within foreign policy and security. 
The Treaty contains a number of important new provisions related to the 
CSDP, including a mutual assistance and a solidarity clause; the creation of a 
framework for Permanent Structured Cooperation; the expansion of the 
Petersberg tasks; and the creation of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy.  
The principles of the Union's external action are set out in Article 21 and are 
described as those which "have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the 
rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, 
and respect for the principles of the United Nations and the Charter of 
international law."
162
 It is intended that the Union will conduct policy in this 
area by defining general guidelines and adopting decisions (the latter 
incorporates the previous distinction between common strategies, common 
positions and joint actions). 
To begin with, we will very briefly look at what exactly the Petersberg tasks 
are and how they relate to the Lisbon Treaty. The Petersberg tasks were 
defined in June 1992 at Hotel Petersberg near Bonn and they cover a wide 
range of topics including humanitarian and rescue missions, conflict 
prevention crisis management and a number of other interrelated issues. 
Petersberg formed an important foundation upon which the Lisbon and 
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Maastricht Treaties would base their visions of a European military force and 
thus are an important step towards how Europe envisaged its role as a security 
actor.  
For the purposes of this thesis we will only analyse the relevant sections of the 
Lisbon Treaty; we will begin with the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). The goal of the CSDP is to enable the Union to take a proactive role 
in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of 
international security.
163
 Its aim is to provide the EU with a comprehensive 
approach towards crisis management drawing on both civilian and military 
assets at a time when military assets are dwindling and the need for the 
pooling of resources is critical to the success of any mission. Perhaps the most 
important aspect of the CSDP was the inclusion of a progressive framing of a 
common Union defence policy. This policy has the ultimate aim of providing 
common Union-wide defence. However, it must be pointed out that this goal 
of creating a common defence policy remained simply that, a goal. When we 
look carefully at the text we discover,  
The policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the 
specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states, 
which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, under the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the 
common security and defence policy established within that framework.
164
 
Once again, we see a very visible divide between Member States who favour a 
European approach and those that see the way forward as being framed in an 
Atlantic approach. This dual system once again reminds us of the previous 
attempts to create a European defence force; nations such as the UK do not see 
their security and hard foreign policy from a solely European perspective, 
while other nations such as France, who have a more conflicted view of 
NATO, are more eager to see the realisation of a European defence force. 
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While one could argue that this is rather a bold statement based on only one 
section of the Treaty, the reality is that we see time and time again a very 
opaque message being delivered in the Lisbon Treaty towards collective 
security. For example In Section 3A of the Treaty it states,  
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as 
well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It 
shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial 
integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national 
security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of 
each Member State.
165
 
This is a rather startling position to take in comparison to the NATO Treaty 
which guarantees the protection of all its Member States by stating that an 
attack on one state is an attack on all states; the Lisbon Treaty however, quite 
clearly states that "national security remains the sole responsibility of each 
Member State".
166
 This statement, when taken in isolation, would seem to 
indicate that national security remains the sole role of the Member State; 
however Article 42.4 of the Treaty states, 
“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other 
Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all 
the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and 
defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this 
area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the 
foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation".
167
 
On the surface, Article 42.4 would appear to offer the same protection and 
guarantees that NATO does under Article 5 of its Charter, but does it? To 
begin with, there are currently three Member States of the EU that are 
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constitutionally neutral, Ireland, Austria and Sweden, and who therefore would 
either not act or be able to act due to military incapability or political 
unwillingness. How does this impact the understanding and implementation of 
the requirement to provide ‘aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power?’ Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, why is there specific 
reference to NATO commitments? These commitments pose intriguing 
hypothetical scenarios that in the current climate are not entirely 
inconceivable; we could ask: what would happen if Turkey militarily attacked 
Cyprus? EU Member States would be required by the Lisbon Treaty to defend 
Cyprus from the Turkish attack, and yet Turkey is a NATO member. As a 
consequence, how would the EU's NATO members react? Alternatively, we 
could pose an even more likely scenario: what would the EU's reaction be to a 
repeat of the Falklands War; would Spain and Portugal come to the assistance 
of the British, or would they express unwillingness to become involved in a 
conflict that is deemed to be irrelevant, or at worst, would they agree with the 
Argentinian argument that British sovereign territory is in fact Argentinian? 
While these two hypothetical scenarios are just that, hypothetical, they do 
underline a very real and worrying issue surrounding the concept of European 
security. What would Europe do in a situation framed by acute conflicts of 
commitment? The EU and Member States are obliged to defend the territorial 
integrity of each of its Member States and yet we have witnessed time and 
again that Europe has been unwilling to assist its close neighbours, such as 
Ukraine  and the Balkans, despite claiming in Article 2.5, for example, of the 
Lisbon Treaty that,   
“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its 
values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall 
contribute to peace, security . . . and the protection of human rights”.168 
Where are the values and security that the EU is providing to these nations? 
Why should the citizens of the Falklands or Cyprus expect the EU to act when 
it has not done so in the past for other nations within Europe or within the 
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European neighbourhood? Questions like these, which remain unanswered, 
undermine the credibility of Europe’s ambitions to be an effective actor in 
international security. This inability to act in a decisive and cohesive manner 
was instrumental in the creation of the "EU Battlegroups", which were created 
as a result of the doctrines outlined in the Lisbon Treaty; so what then are the 
EU Battlegroups and are they a final realisation of a truly European military? 
EU Battlegroups. 
The various attempts by Europe to construct a credible and viable European 
military following World War Two, and have all meet with apparent failure. 
This failure, as discussed throughout this thesis, has been shown to lie, in part 
at least, in the unwillingness and inability of the Member States to consistently 
contribute large numbers of their personnel and resources to any proposed 
integrated European military. This incapacity has been displayed on multiple 
occasions over the past few decades and has, at times, made the EU to look 
like a shambolic and divided actor unable to get its own house in order when 
confronted with fast paced regional security concerns and therefore, one which 
has had to rely on the United States in order to act. The Battlegroup strategy 
has attempted to address this reality. 
For many years, the EU has declared itself to be a global actor that is ready to 
undertake its share of responsibility for global security; this clearly remains an 
aspirational goal only. However on the 1st of January 2007, the EU 
Battlegroup concept officially reached full operational status.
169
 The concept 
of the Battlegroup has been present for many years within European security 
thinking; however it was not until the 1999 Helsinki European Council 
meeting, that a rapid response force was identified as constituting an important 
aspect of crisis management.
170
 As a result, the Helsinki Headline Goal of 
2003 assigned to the Member States the requirement of being able to 
successfully provide rapid response elements to the Union in a short space of 
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time. In what can be considered the first autonomous EU-led military 
operation, Artemis showed that in theory that Europe could conduct a military 
operation at a great distance from Europe with relative success. It must be 
noted here that Operation Artemis was a Police training mission and is 
arguably not a valid example of what the Battlegroups were ultimately 
designed for; however, many commentators view that this operation can be 
understood as a litmus test for effective operations by the EU in a hostile zone.  
Operation Artemis became the reference model to be used for the further 
development of the Battlegroup concept; thus the Headline Goal 2010, which 
was delivered in 2004, set out new objectives to be achieved by the Member 
States in light of the lessons learned from Artemis. French and British leaders 
were determined not to allow the lessons learned in Artemis to go to waste and 
thus officially put forward the Battlegroup concept in 2004 as part of the 2004 
Headline Goal. The Battlegroup concept is regarded as an important aspect of 
any implementation of the defence aspects of the 2003 European Security 
Strategy.
171
 The idea of developing such a concept was initially discussed at a 
bi-lateral Franco-British summit in Le Touquet on 4 February 2003 and was 
further reinforced on the 24 November 2003. At that meeting the two countries 
referred to the need, building upon the precedent of the French-led 
autonomous EU Operation Artemis, for "credible Battlegroup sized forces" – 
of about 1,500 soldiers each with appropriate transport and sustainability– to 
be created so as to strengthen the EU rapid reaction capability to support 
United Nations’ operations.172 This move towards the Battlegroup concept 
echoed what had been previously discussed in St Malo in 1998,  
“the potential scope of ESDP should match the world-wide ambition of the 
European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and should be able to 
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support effectively the EU’s wider external policy objectives to promote 
democracy, human rights, good governance and reform".
173
 
On the 24th of November 2003 the UK and France further stated,  
“Our two countries now wish to build on these first steps in crisis 
management operations in two areas: the relationship between the EU and the 
UN in the field of crisis management; and further work on capability 
development. … we now propose that the EU should build on this [operation 
Artemis] precedent so that it is able to respond through ESDP to future similar 
requests from the United Nations, whether in Africa or elsewhere.”174 
Following these high level Franco-British discussions, the proposals outlined 
were quickly endorsed by Germany in February 2004 and on the 10th of 
February were submitted to the Political and Security Committee which, in 
turn, asked for the Military Committee’s opinion on the technical aspects of 
the concept (February 18, 2004). It subsequently gained further support at the 
Brussels informal defence ministers and Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting, on 
the 5th and 6th of April 2004. This support enabled an ambitious target of 
2007 to achieve the first operational Battlegroups with early expectations 
ranging from between six and ten. 
Today the Battlegroup concept, according to the European External Action 
Service, "provides the EU with a specific tool in the range of rapid response 
capabilities, which contributes to make the EU more coherent, more active and 
more capable. This concept enables the EU to respond rapidly to emerging 
crises with military means, taking into account the size and capabilities of the 
Battlegroups on stand-by".
175
 What then are the basic features of a 
Battlegroup? 
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A Battlegroup is the minimum militarily effective a credible and coherent, 
rapidly deployable force package capable of stand-alone operations or for the 
initial phase of larger operations. It is based on combined-arms, battalion-
sized force, reinforced with combat-support and combat service-support 
elements. In their generic composition, but depending on the mission, 
Battlegroups are about 1 500 personnel strong.
176
 
To expand, a Battlegroup is the maximisation of assets to achieve a predefined 
goal through the usage of all assets available. This includes specialists such as 
IT, armoured vehicles and a whole range of both lethal and non-lethal options 
available to a 21st Century military. These new Battlegroups aimed to address 
the shortcomings of the Previous European Rapid Reaction force by 
advocating for smaller more deployable forces as opposed to the tens of 
thousands previously called for.
177
 To achieve this Battlegroups would be 
based upon four key concepts; 
1. Stand-alone Battlegroup-size forces (around 1,500 strong, including Core 
Battalion, Combat Support and Combat Service Support with appropriate 
strategic lift, sustainability and disembarkation assets).  
2. Battlegroups formed with contributions from one or more member states 
(yet open to participation by third parties). 
3. Battlegroup formations deployable within 10 days following a Council 
decision and able to sustain operations for 30 days (extendable up to 120 
days if appropriately resupplied). 
4. Battlegroups designed to operate within the typical UN Chapter VII 
mandates to restore international peace and security (although conceivable 
also for such operations as the evacuation of EU citizens).
178
 
These four key concepts would enable the EU to effectively provide a military 
force that was readily available and employable, that is being able to operate in 
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a professional and effective manner in all zones of conflict. In addition, it is 
intended that the Battlegroups will also be highly flexible and have a high 
level of survivability in that they well be able to operate successfully in 
challenging zones while attaining minimal disruptions through issues such as 
casualties. The Battlegroup initiative drew initial commitments from 22 EU 
Member States, in addition to Norway, which would generate a total number 
of 13 Battlegroups. In addition to these commitments, a number of Member 
States offered additional resources such as a multinational and deployable 
Force Headquarters (France), a Sealift Co-ordination Centre (Greece), a water 
purification unit (Lithuania), and a medical group (Cyprus).
179
 
Perhaps what is most striking about the proposed Battlegroups was that they 
would act in unison with NATO. The Battlegroups were designed so that they 
could act with a NATO Response Force (NRF), which has essentially the same 
function as a Battlegroup; however the NRF are designed with the ability to 
operate in high intensity conflict, whereas due to the size of the Battlegroups 
they are more appropriate for dealing with smaller scale conflict (but are more 
deployable due to their size). 
One of the most challenging aspects of the Battlegroup strategy is the ability 
to deployed within 10 days; this is a mammoth undertaking when we consider 
the considerable size and scope of the logistics involved in moving 1500 
people plus all their equipment and food and so on to any location in the 
world. To achieve this goal, a Battlegroup must have pre-identified and 
committed forces and assets available at any given time which must be 
sustainable for a period of between 30 - 120 days. This rapid deployment 
requires the usage of strategic lift and logistics. A similar pattern of challenges 
exists in the Battlegroup strategy as has been identified throughout this paper; 
there exists a considerable shortfall in the availability of key enablers, in 
particular strategic air lift, and the Member States are committed to finding the 
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necessary enablers for each Battlegroup.
180
 In an attempt to address this very 
apparent shortfall the Headline Goal 2010 includes a number of objectives to 
improve this shortfall these objectives are: 
1. To implement by 2005 EU joint coordination in strategic lift (air, land and sea) 
as a step towards achieving full capacity and efficiency in strategic lift by 
2010. 
2. To transform (in particular for airlift) the European Airlift Co-ordination Cell 
into the European Airlift Centre by 2004 and to develop (between some 
member states) a European airlift command by 2010. 
3. To complete by 2007 the establishment of EU battle groups, including the 
identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and disembarkation 
assets. 
4. To acquire the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing 
and escort by2008.
181
 
It is important to note here the important role that the Member States play in 
the Battlegroup strategy. It is the responsibility of the individual Member 
States to provide a Battlegroup 'package' which entails the resources and 
personnel to a Battlegroup. There is currently no fixed structure to what these 
'packages' must include, this allows for flexibility in what a Member State 
provides. For example, if a nation has a highly skilled medical unit then they 
can provide this as part of the package. Alternatively, a nation such as the UK 
could acceptably provide an amphibious force to a Battlegroup. The process 
by which these packages are offered is decided during the six-monthly EUMS-
chaired Battlegroup Coordination Conferences (BGCC). The planning horizon 
of the BGCC is six years and is divided into three different levels of 
commitment connected with the years ahead from the BGCC.
182
 It is important 
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to clarify that while a nation may offer its resources to a Battlegroup, these 
packages must meet agreed upon military standards. 
"Standards and criteria embodied in the Battlegroup concept and the 
Battlegroup preparation guide form the basis for Member States to develop 
specific instructions to ensure coherence between the constituent parts of the 
Battlegroup package, taking into account the principle of multinationality".
183
 
These standards are essential; as modern Western militaries are professional 
and employ the usage of technology that is highly lethal, it is important that 
participating packages meet the required standards before being allowed into a 
Battlegroup. These standards are not just concerned with ensuring a tank, for 
example, is fully operational but also and perhaps more importantly it means 
that personnel who are part of any package have received the right standard of 
training to successfully operate within a Battlegroup. This training is the sole 
responsibility of the Member State; as such it would appear that certain nations 
would provide more able resources than others. Finally, prior to any 
deployment of a Battlegroup, it must be certified; this certification is achieved 
once again by the participating Member States and is overseen by the EU 
Military Committee in line with established EU agreed procedures. Once a 
Battlegroup has been certified then a Commander, who is appointed by the 
Council on a case by case basis, will be assigned.
184
 
In light of the fact that any potential Battlegroup will consist of multiple 
nationalities, the concept of Interoperability is vital. Interoperability is a very 
complex subject; however in its most basic form, Interoperability is the ability 
of one set of forces to communicate and operate with another.
185
 This is not a 
new concept, whether it is through flags and trumpets of the ancient era to 
modern satellite communications, the premise would appear to be similar; and 
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yet contemporary Interoperability is considerably more complex than that. 
Contemporary Western militaries are highly integrated and require 
considerable levels of Interoperability to succeed; for example, soldiers in a 
tank need to be able to communicate with an aircraft, while said aircraft needs 
to be also able to be able to communicate with forward observers, who in turn 
are in contact with the HQ, who is often in contact with Naval vessels. This 
scenario is complex in itself and becomes even more so when different 
militaries with different equipment and protocols attempt to operate together. 
Therefore Interoperability has become a key objective for modern armed 
forces and is crucial for multinational forces. NATO has led the way in 
overcoming European and Transatlantic difficulties of Interoperability by 
developing agreements on military standards and procedures known as 
STANAGS which form the basis for Member States Interoperability 
strategies.
186
 Despite this, even at an early stage, there were expected to be 
significant problems for the Battlegroups, in particular for the actual 
interaction of military units from different member states which might not be 
familiar with training and working together. It is also important to briefly note 
that the difficulties surrounding Interoperability are not just limited to 
communication, but also just as importantly the usage of technology and 
resources such as tanks within the Battlegroup.  
We have established that the concept of Interoperability is vital to the ability 
of any modern military to act in a cohesive manner; however, there is an even 
more vital aspect of military capability that needs to be addressed, that of the 
financial backing of any military force. The phrase ‘an army marches on its 
stomach’ is as broadly true today as it was in antiquity; to achieve this vital 
aspect of security, the EU initiated the Athena mechanism. The Athena 
mechanism handles "the financing of common costs relating to EU military 
operations under the EU's common security and defence policy (CSDP). It 
operates on behalf of the 27 EU member states who contribute to the financing 
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of EU military operations".
187
  The Athena mechanism was established in 2004 
and was reinforced in the 14th May 2007 Council Decision 2011/871/CFSP 
which sort to establish "a mechanism to administer the financing of the 
common costs of European Union operations having military or defence 
implications.”188 The purpose of introducing Athena is due to the fact that any 
military operations undertaken by the CFSP are not covered by the European 
Budget; therefore, any proposed action is funded by the Member States. As a 
consequence, Athena provides a mechanism to administer the financing of the 
common costs relating to these operations. It is important to note that this 
mechanism has a legal capacity and relates to two types of operations, EU 
Military Operations, and military support actions; the latter is a Council-
backed or mandated decision that supports a third party state which is not 
under the authority of the European Headquarters. 
The primary function of this mechanism is to manage the financing of 
common costs for any operation; for example, this includes transport, 
infrastructure and fuel. Athena is managed and directed by an administrator 
who acts under the authority of a Special Committee which is comprised of 
representatives of the Member States contributing to an operation.
189
  It is 
important to note that according to Protocol Number 22, Denmark does not 
participate in the decisions and actions of the Union in relation to defence.
190
 
In addition to this committee, Athena is comprised of three management 
bodies which are under the authority of the Special Committee, these are: 
1. The Administrator who represents Athena’s permanent executive 
authority, draws up any draft budget and submits it to the Special 
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Committee, and ensures the proper implementation of the committee’s 
decisions; 
2. The Operation Commander who carries out duties on behalf of Athena in 
relation to the financing of the common costs of the operation which s/he 
commands. In particular, the Operations Commander must send the 
Administrator proposals for the "expenditure – operational common costs" 
section of the budgets and, as authorising officer, implement the 
appropriations relating to the financing of the operation. 
3. The Accounting Officer who keeps the accounts for Athena and is 
responsible for proper implementation of payments, collection of revenue 
and recovery of amounts established as being receivable.
191
 
How then is Athena financed by the Member States?  
Annex I to the Decision lists the common costs of operations borne by Athena 
whenever they are incurred (certain mission expenditure, costs related to 
storing materials, etc.). 
Annex II to the Decision lists the common costs relating to the preparatory 
phase of an operation borne by Athena. 
Annex III to the Decision lists the common costs which can be borne by 
Athena during the active phase of operations (the establishment of 
headquarters, transport costs, salaries of locally hired personnel, etc.). 
Drawing up the budget 
Each year, the administrator proposes the draft budget for the following year 
to the Special Committee by 31 October at the latest. The budget is drawn up 
with the support of each operation commander for the "operational common 
costs" section, it must include: This budget must include appropriations to 
cover the costs incurred in ongoing operations and in preparing for or 
completing an operation; it also must include a forecast of the revenue which 
will be required to cover expenditure. 
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1. The appropriations to cover the common costs incurred in preparation for, 
or further to, operations. 
2. The appropriations to cover the operational common costs for on-going or 
planned operations; 
3, a forecast of the revenue to cover expenditure. 
In the case of EU Military Rapid Response operations, flexible early financing 
procedures are provided for to attain the level of the reference amount set by 
the administrator.
192
 
The Athena mechanisms are a potential step forward towards providing a 
common financial resource for Battlegroups, however it must be stressed that 
these mechanisms are highly dependent upon Member States contributing to 
the financing of any proposed military excursion and thus leaves the viability 
of any mission unknown due to the ever-changing political manoeuvring of the 
Member States. This concern is addressed later in the thesis. 
A further key element in overcoming Interoperability problems for 
deployment of multinational forces will be the pre-deployment training. Whilst 
the Member States have not been able to agree an EU level Standard of 
Training for Multinational Battlegroups, they have agreed to improve 
Interoperability within each individual multinational Battlegroup through 
training at the national level. The HG 2010 adds that the Member States are 
committed to develop quantitative benchmarks and criteria for national forces 
committed to the Headline Goal in the field of deployability and in the field of 
multinational training.
193
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No Battlegroup deployment. 
Looking at the relatively new strategy of the Battlegroup it would appear that 
the EU finally had a credible military option which could be effectively 
utilised to counter gross human rights abuses and other serious international 
problems that the EU had in the past been unable to address. Yet we once 
again, we see to date the failure of the EU to act in a decisive and credible 
manner. Despite being in existence since the 1st of January 2007, not a single 
Battlegroup has ever been deployed although there have been multiple 
occasions in which deployment could have occurred. Why has the EU once 
again failed to act despite having what would appear to be a well-balanced 
strategy? 
The answer to this question would seem to lie once again in the inability for 
the Member States to act in a coherent manner and is explored in the following 
analysis. 
 
Section Three: Analysis. 
With the march towards a unified EU military well and truly underway, as laid 
out in this section, it is time to analyse the positions that have been explored in 
this section from a Constructivist perspective. To begin with we will analyse 
how the post-war European continent approached the issue of military 
integration. 
Divided from the start: The German question.  
One cannot doubt that the widespread and cataclysmic destruction and 
enormous loss of life, both civilian and military, profoundly influenced what 
was on the slate of the post-war European nations and even the United States. 
It is little wonder then that the question of Germany was controversial in 
regards to formulating the initial steps necessary for military integration and 
was a key debating point within the Pleven Plan put forward by the French. It 
is interesting to note here that, as with NATO, the discord over what to do 
regarding Germany was between the Anglo-American world and that of the 
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French. It is of little wonder that the issue surrounding Western Germany and 
collective defence was a thorny one. Let us not forget that nations like France 
had until very recently been occupied by the Wehrmacht, while a nation such 
as the US had only suffered on its periphery, such as in the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbour. Therefore, the slate from which the elite in France were 
working would have been fundamentally different to that of the US. The 
French slate was deeply inscribed with suffering, humiliation and internal 
divisions which extended to hatred and the exacting of personal revenge. It is 
important to point out here in balance that the UK had also suffered 
considerable pain and loss through the agency of the German war machine, it 
would be expected that their own slate would have been affected by such 
terrible tragedies as the blitz; and yet, they still advocated for the US position 
over the issue of Germany. With reflection one could posit that whether or not 
a nation was occupied, like France, or free to fight, like the UK and the US, 
made the pivotal difference in the post-war slates. 
The answer to this apparent conundrum can be understood to reside in 
Weldes’ argument concerning national interests and how they are constructed. 
Weldes states, “specific identities are created when social relations are 
depicted” and that “national interests are social constructions . . . (from) which 
the world . . . and the place of the state is understood”.194 From these two 
statements we can begin to understand why there is such a disparity between 
the UK and France; it is a well-known fact that the UK and the US even to this 
day have a ‘special relationship’ status with one another. Despite fighting a 
violent war of independence with each other, the UK has constructed its slate 
upon the depth of its interrelationship with the US and consequently sees its 
interests as supporting its previous colony-turned-powerhouse to achieve not 
only American security but also its own. It is interesting to note regarding the 
American War for Independence that while the French were one of the key 
allies with whom the Patriots fought the British; it is with the British that 
America has aligned itself with. This reality further reinforces Weldes’ 
argument regarding the fact that social constructions are based on perceptions 
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of reality and do not have to be based on reality itself. We could assume in this 
context that the conflicting events which France experienced during the first 
half of the 20
th
 Century had a greater effect on its slate than did the events of 
the American War of Independence. 
While the outcome of the Pleven Plan and the issues surrounding Germany are 
now history, as we look at the march towards a unified European military from 
a Constructivist perspective, we can see that the slates of the competing 
nations were already deeply inscribed, right from the beginning. As we have 
seen, these entrenched views have been difficult to uproot. Before we move 
on, it is interesting to witness just how fluid a nation’s slate can be; at times 
the writing on the slate seems to deep and permanent, like carving in stone, 
while at other times the slate is filled with only faint chalk marks which are 
easily erased. The Pleven Plan, as explored earlier in this section, was a plan 
developed and promoted by the French government only to be voted against 
and thus destroyed by the French government itself due to concerns regarding 
sovereignty. This reality clearly shows that while Weldes is correct in pointing 
out that the elite base their decisions upon their own constructed slate, this 
author believes that she does not take into consideration strongly enough the 
fact that in democratic societies multiple slates can exist within a nation’s elite 
and thus, within a fluid system such as democracy where changes to the elite 
occur on a regular basis, the content on a national slate can be very fluid and 
impermanent.  
The reality of multiple and potentially conflicting slates both within the 
European region and also, just as importantly, within the various states shows 
quite clearly how difficult the task of creating a unified European military 
actually is. Each of these identities has constructed its own slate from which 
they make their decisions, while simultaneously influencing each other’s slate; 
all these interfaces in turn lead to a continuously evolving European slate. 
While this reality should be expected on the global scene, it takes on a more 
important aspect when it is present in a single entity such as the slowly 
emerging body that would become European Union. The reality of this single 
entity containing multiple personalities competing for control of that entity has 
set it on a long path of confusion and inaction; the condition continues to make 
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any attempts to form a unified military fraught with difficulty. This difficulty 
is even more complicated when we consider an outside presence both wielding 
considerable power over this body while simultaneously enjoying good 
relations with one of the identities and greatly angering another; I speak of 
course the United States. 
It is undeniable that in the early post-war years the US played a significant 
role in shaping the way Member States, and Europe as a whole, understood 
and shaped their identities in regards to defence. When we look at the Pleven 
Plan and other prototypes explored in this thesis, we see that the US has 
consistently played a leadership role. From a Constructivist view, it is clear 
that in the early days that the slates of Europe were in many ways defined by 
the US, whether it was in a positive manner such as in the UK, or in an 
increasingly hostile manner as in the case of the French. This important role 
was fundamental in shaping the Pleven Plan; let us not forget that if the Pleven 
Plan had been established, that it would have been an American and not a 
European who would have led this force. When we compare this early 
leadership role that the US played with more contemporary events such as 
those laid out in Section Two, it is fascinating to witness that the European 
slate is still very much influenced by American leadership and is still, for all 
intents and purposes, incapable of acting on a scale such as required in Libya 
or the Balkans without American supervision. As explored earlier in Section 
Two, Europe has needed the US to lead them in security actions in areas that 
are geographically within Europe’s sphere of influence; one could strongly 
argue that despite claims of possessing the ability to act independently, the EU 
and its members slates have a similarity to that of post-war Europe and are still 
subject to the “what do the Americans think” test. 
The influence of the US upon the slates of the EU and its members has not 
gone unnoticed; as we explored earlier in this section, the UK and France have 
in the past attempted to ameliorate the situation of European inability in 
regards to security. The Saint-Malo declaration clearly stated that “The 
European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the 
international stage” and that the “Union must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide 
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to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crises”.195 These statements would seem to indicate that both the UK and 
France viewed that the burgeoning European dream of Union was woefully 
incapable of acting in a credible manner on the international scene regarding 
security. From a Constructivist view we can understand that at the time of this 
declaration, both parties had already constructed a view towards what would 
become the EU, and it is clear that this view was that Europe did not and 
would not possess the necessary characteristics to adequately address this issue 
of being a credible actor on the international stage. This constructed slate 
would appear to be a prime example of what Weldes states as the process of 
‘articulation’, that is the process through which meaning is produced out of 
extant cultural raw materials and linguistic resources. One is not surprised that 
both the UK and France’s slates would view the European project as being 
incapable of credible common security as late as the 90s. 
However, as with many attempts to create a credible European military, the 
Saint-Malo declaration was a failure. This failure once again can be 
understood from and attributed to competing ideologies and conflicting slates. 
The fact remains that between Europe’s two most powerful military actors 
there remains a large chasm regarding their constructed identities and the role 
of the US. This recurring theme of the Anglo-American/French divide lies at 
the heart of the slate and constructed identity that Europe has collectively 
constructed for itself and is a major stumbling block for any progress towards 
a credible European military. 
This ongoing divide has been a consistent companion of the European project 
right through to contemporary times. In the final and summative analysis for 
this thesis, the author will tie together all the historic actions with the modern 
attempts to create a credible European military and will answer the thesis 
question, “Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the 
integration of the Member States’ militaries? 
 
                                                          
195 UK and French Government. FRANCO-BRITISH SUMMIT JOINT DECLARATION ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE. 4 December 
1998. http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html (accessed March 10, 2014). 
James Comery 51033920 
 
118 
 
SUMMATIVE ANALYSIS:  
With the contents of the historic slate now firmly established in the previous 
sections, it is now time to analyse the contemporary security approach. For this 
summative analysis we will begin from the Maastricht Treaty as this treaty can 
be understood to be the first major European treaty concerning itself with a 
unified military. Maastricht can also be considered to be a major milestone in 
the construction of the contemporary EU. The Maastricht Treaty was a pivotal 
point in regards to how Europe was beginning to view itself from a security 
perspective and it is clear that the constituent elements on Europe’s slate, 
regarding military incompetence, were beginning to shape the elites’ actions. 
As explored earlier in Section Three, the treaty contains a considerable amount 
of language describing how Europe would assert itself on the international 
stage through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy. It 
is interesting to note however, as previously stated, that while the Maastricht 
Treaty appeared to dedicate a considerable level of resourcing to the 
establishment of a common defence policy, when we analyse the language a 
bit closer, this does not actually seem to be the case. The treaty clearly states 
that there would be an “eventual framing of a common defence policy”.196 The 
word ‘eventual’ is a very important one as it reveals that fact that while Europe 
wanted to create a common defence policy it was not prepared, for a variety of 
reasons, to commit itself to actions that would see this taking place 
immediately. Further, it also demonstrates, when taking into consideration 
Europe’s many slates that ‘eventually’ merely indicated a desire or an 
aspirational goal; Europe wanted to resource a common defence policy but 
knew from past experience that it was an unlikely proposition. Thus Europe’s 
policy makers used an ambiguous time frame which allowed Europe to 
convince itself and others that it was about to take action, but at the same time 
protected itself from the division and conflict that acting on the decision would 
have entailed.   
With the important emphasis on ‘eventual’ action, it is surprising that this 
treaty held many ambitious goals such as “to assert its identity on the 
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international scene . . . through the implementation of a common foreign and 
security policy”.197 One could be forgiven for believing that this statement 
should also have finished with the caveat ‘eventually’. With such amorphous 
language, it is of no surprise that little visible progress was made in the pursuit 
of a common defence policy; this is a prime example of how ‘articulation’ and 
the use of linguistic resources can inform us of exactly what is on the slate. In 
the case of Maastricht, it would appear that while the notion of common 
defence was existent on European nation’s slates, the slates were so deeply 
conflicted that it was not seen as vital enough to national interests to require 
real action. Before we progress to the Lisbon Treaty, it is important to point 
out that the Maastricht Treaty, as all the treaties before, was still dependent 
upon the good will of the member states to provide the resources from which 
to be able to act. Thus, any European military would have not been answerable 
to Brussels but in fact to multiple personalities within the body, all of whom 
have their own divergent slates and constructed identities which vie for 
position and with which they would seek to influence the body. 
The Lisbon Treaty is the last major treaty to be enacted by the EU and, just as 
Maastricht and countless other major and minor treaties before it; Lisbon has 
attempted to lessen the concerns surrounding common security. As explored in 
Section Three, the CSDP was a major factor in this treaty. The linguistic 
resources utilised in this Treaty resemble those of Maastricht; statements such 
as “contribute to peace, security . . . and the protection of human rights”198 are 
found throughout. Once again, as in Maastricht and other treaties, we see that 
the language used shows that a real desire to act regarding security does exist 
on the slates of European nations; however, the lack of actual action casts 
doubt on how highly prioritised that desire is. While one can take a pessimistic 
outlook regarding Lisbon, it is important to note that unlike Maastricht, in 
which the linguistic resources were at times vague, Lisbon references to 
security were proactive in that the EU would “(ensure) the territorial integrity 
                                                          
197
 European Community. “The Maastricht Treaty.” Euro Treaties. No Date Given. 
http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf (accessed March 1, 2014). 
198 European Union. “Treaty of Lisbon.” Europa. 17 December 2007. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF (accessed January 10, 2014). 
James Comery 51033920 
 
120 
 
of the state . . . safeguarding national security” and “it shall contribute to 
peace, security . . . and the protection of human rights”.199 While the language 
used here is proactive, it still remains vague in terms of what exactly this 
constitutes and thus the reader is left wondering, in the light of previous 
inaction, exactly what if anything the EU would do.  
The role of the Member States has been an important one from the very 
inception of the European project. As in previous analyses, we have witnessed 
just how divided the Member States are regarding common defence, and in 
particular the UK and France. Concern about the impact of these divisions is 
very much evident within the treaty. Lisbon clearly states “the Union . . . shall 
not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence of . . . member 
states which see their common defence realised in (NATO)”.200 These words 
are clearly intended to make room for the aspirations and security policies of 
nations such as the UK; in this way, they underline the fact that despite EU 
claims to be working towards a common defence program, the reality is that 
the Member States themselves do not believe that a unified credible European 
military can currently exist due to the fact of competing identities and 
ambitions within the Member States. This divide between the Member States 
would appear to play an additional role in shaping what is on the slates of 
European Member States and the EU as a body. Every treaty contains this 
important caveat regarding NATO, and this seems to indicate that the 
summative constructed defence identity of the EU is that it is a divided actor 
with no common defence identity.  
This is rather a robust claim but it is reinforced by the fact that despite the 
numerous pledges by Europe to have a common defence policy, the fact 
remains that they do not have one now, nor have they ever had one, nor do 
they seem to know how to move out of this morass. As explored in earlier 
sections, events in Syria and Libya substantiate this claim. The EU was unable 
to agree whether it should arm Syrian rebels; in Libya, the EU Member States 
were unable to agree whether or not they should attack, and those that did 
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agree to attack were incapable of doing so in a sustained manner without 
American leadership and support. Let us not forget that following the Lisbon 
Treaty in which the EU made many public statements about its commitments 
to a common foreign policy, the EU struggled to overthrow a third world 
dictator. From a Constructivist perspective what does this mean? One could 
clearly argue that the EU is delusional in regards to its claims of a common 
security policy, and that this notion of ‘common action’ is in and of itself a 
social construction created by the elites of the EU to display to the world that it 
is the new ‘normative actor’. One could also argue that this constructed 
identity of being the world’s conscience and moral teacher has links back to 
the old colonial glories of many of the Member States’ histories, during which 
time they garnered power and wealth while instructing the ‘ignorant savages’ 
living in these far flung colonies. As Weldes states regarding constructed 
identities, they are “simultaneously given an identity . . . with characteristics 
which are sometimes precise and certain (and) at other times vague . . . their 
importance lies not in their accuracy but in their provision of warranting 
conditions which make a particular action or belief more justified”.201 
Therefore we can posit that the consistently vague statements made by the EU 
regarding common security are nothing more than a comforting constructed 
identity which is believed by a number of elites; believed, but not enough to be 
acted upon. 
While this inability to act can once again be seen to be a product of the 
division between the Member States, it is also this same EU inability to act 
which has influenced the Member States’ own slates regarding collective 
security. This inability to act is exemplified by the EU Battlegroup strategy. 
As explored earlier in Section Three, the battlegroup strategy is an attempt by 
Europe to have a credible common security arm and yet, as we have seen for 
the past 70 years, Europe cannot and does not act. Despite being in existence 
now for a number of years, during which many tumultuous events have taken 
place on the EU’s doorstep, not a single Battlegroup has ever been deployed; 
during this same time period, a number of NATO rapid reaction forces have 
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been deployed. Once again we are left wondering if Europe is incapable of 
acting without American leadership. Is the EU’s constructed identity so 
insecure and disaggregated that without American leadership it cannot act 
alone? Or is it an example of a multiple personality disorder, in which the EU 
‘mind’ has multiple conflicting identities each vying for supremacy at the 
expense of the other personalities present? Or finally, is the political will 
simply not there to enact the ambitious claims laid out in the Treaties? To 
answer this final question, we will let the EU Parliament speak for itself by 
analysing its own legislation. 
What does the Parliament think? 
So far in this thesis, we have read and analysed various primary and secondary 
resources and then used these resources to formulate an argument about the 
EU and its beliefs and actions towards military integration. While the 
information and arguments put forwards are important and enlightening, what 
the EU Parliament actually says about itself is even more so. The statements 
below are taken from a resolution published on September 12
th
 2013. The very 
first item under general considerations states;  
“Notes with increasing urgency the EU’s insufficient capacity to respond to 
international crises in a timely and efficient manner, in spite of its long-
standing commitment to preserving peace, safeguarding human rights, 
preventing conflicts”202 
These words are then reaffirmed in consideration 3,  
“Notes with regret that recent military operations in both Libya and Mali have 
demonstrated the lack of progress toward a truly Common Security and Defence 
Policy and stresses the need for more coordination and cooperation at the European 
level, if the EU is to be taken seriously as an effective and credible world actor” 203 
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These two statements serve as examples only. The fact that linguistic 
resources such as ‘regret’, ‘urgency’, ‘insufficient’ and ‘to be taken seriously’ 
have been used by the EU to talk about its own common defence policies 
underpins what has been argued here as being on the EU and its Member 
States’ slates. When we consider that these words have been carefully and 
skilfully chosen to be put into official record, we must surely find ourselves 
wondering at just how the constructed identity of the EU could have rendered 
it so profoundly incapable in regards to acting as a credible security actor. We 
recall at this point, that the current level of incapability has been preceded by 
decades of discussion and treaty formulation. When one’s own parliament, 
which is arguably the most vital  component of the constructed identity of a 
regional body, uses language such as this to describe EU’s own action, or lack 
of action, it is little wonder Member States like Britain choose to steer their 
own course. It is also unsurprising that the US holds the EU in such contempt; 
after all, if they do not believe in themselves, it is only natural that others have 
the same attitude.  
The resolution quoted above goes further in its condemnation of the body by 
stating its “grave concern at the continuing and uncoordinated cuts in national 
defence budgets”.204 This was clearly an issue in 2013 and yet despite making 
this resolution, the very Member States who agreed to the carefully 
constructed linguistic resource have not only continued their uncoordinated 
cuts, but have in many cases deepened them. This reality begs the question, 
should anyone, either within the EU or outside, care what constructed identity 
the EU has towards being an international security actor? An easy answer to 
this question is ‘no’; as has been documented throughout this thesis, the EU 
and its predecessors say one thing while in the process of turning around and 
doing the exact opposite. The commitments to previous and current military 
alliances are ignored, while paying lip service to their commitments on the 
international stage. However, the more reasonable answer would be ‘yes, we 
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should care what the EU says and does’. The European Union is a vast region 
with a large population base and huge trading power. It is also the home and 
cradle of Western civilisation. What happens there affects us all. 
The resolution quoted above adds further to the woes of a credible European 
mission by stating in regards to EU Battlegroups that it;  
“deplores the fact that the concept has not yet proven its utility as a rapid reaction 
instrument in operations, and that without substantial modifications any agreement 
on deployment appears unlikely; considers that the situation in Mali is a missed 
opportunity for the first use of EU battlegroups” 205 
Once again we see language such as ‘deplores’ and ‘unlikely’; it cannot be 
stressed enough at this point that these resolutions are carefully constructed 
linguistic resources, they have not been thrown together hastily or carelessly; 
hence, they clearly reveal what is on the slate of the EU and constitute a clear 
indication of how this constructed identity views itself. As Weldes states, 
“national interests are social constructions . . . (from ) which the world . . . and 
the place of the state in it is understood”.206 From this resolution alone we can 
see that while the EU would like to see itself as an international actor, in 
reality it understands that it is not. It is fascinating to read in this resolution 
that despite the very long and documented history of inaction and blatantly 
empty commitments, this resolution states in section 24 that “(the EU) 
Welcomes the renewed commitment of the Member States to the level of 
ambition of the battlegroups concept and the pledge to plan contributions on 
the basis of regularly recurring commitments in order to avoid gaps in the 
battlegroup roster in the future”.207 This statement is made despite the fact that 
only a few sentences earlier the resolution highlights that “Council and EEAS 
(needs) to increase the flexibility and usability of the battlegroups, which have, 
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however, produced little tangible result to date” and that it “takes the view that 
the reviewed ATHENA mechanism for common costs of military operations 
still does not take adequately into account the specificities of the battlegroup 
concept”.208 This quotation further reinforces the abject failures of the EU to 
form a credible military capability. 
It is important to highlight that these statements have not been cherry picked 
to back up the author’s arguments. On the 12th of September 2013, the 
prognosis was much the same; one of the many resolutions published on that 
day  stated that the European Parliament “regrets the fact, however, that the 
EU Member States have been imposing severe cuts in national defence 
budgets . . . may entail serious consequences for the (Union)”.209 This position 
was expanded upon in a further resolution in which the European Parliament, 
“regrets . . the situation . . . (as) one of duplication, overlap, waste of resources 
and turf war among EU bodies and institutions”.210 The term ‘turf war’ is an 
important one as it clearly demonstrates that the EU, through the use of 
carefully considered language, has compared the Member States and EU 
bodies to nothing better than street gangs engaged in futile and debilitating 
fighting over resources. This is a startling comment, and yet this is precisely 
what the EU is stating; there is no reason to pretend the resolution meant 
something other than the bald facts as stated. The EU specifically chose to 
employ this phrase, and just as specifically as it chose not to employ a more 
refrained phrase such as ‘difficulties’. How can the EU be taken seriously 
regarding military integration when it describes its own members as acting no 
more wisely or circumspectly than street gangs? 
The question must be asked, what actual concrete steps have been taken by the 
Member States? As of May 2015, there still has not been a single Battlegroup 
deployment and budget cuts are still gouging military effectiveness. These 
                                                          
208 European Parliament. European Parliament resolution on 12 September 2013. 12 September 2013. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0381&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-
0205 (accessed March 1, 205). 
209
 European Parliament. Maritime dimension of the common security and defence policy. 12 September 2013. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-
0380+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN (accessed March 1, 2015). 
210
 Ibid 
James Comery 51033920 
 
126 
 
internally contradictory messages of confidence, self-criticism, ambition and 
inaction seem to be symptomatic of the EU’s history of integration; the 
symptoms are found at both the EU level and that of the Member State. These 
symptoms of internal contradiction and disaggregation could be quite arguably 
understood and explained as a case of regional ‘multiple personality disorder’. 
Multiple Personality Disorder. 
Definition: As defined by Psychology Today, Multiple Personality Disorder 
can be understood as “a severe condition in which two or more distinct 
identities, or personality states, are present in—and alternately take control 
of—an individual. The person also experiences memory loss that is too 
extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness”.211 
To take the position that the EU suffers from Multiple Personality Disorder 
does, on the surface, seem highly controversial; and yet when applied to the 
EU regarding security, we come to a startling conclusion.  
Let us begin with the first aspect of this ‘disorder’; a “severe condition in 
which two or more distinct identities, or personality states, are present” can be 
clearly viewed to be present within the EU. This thesis has shown throughout 
that there exist two highly competitive and conflicting major viewpoints or 
identities, within the EU, these being the UK and France. It has become 
abundantly clear throughout that these two conflicting personalities have a 
history of attempting to influence the body at the expense of the other 
personality. In fact, they also often attempt to gain dominance over the other 
micro and macro identities found within the body, for example the 
constitutionally pacifist states. This conflict has become so critical that the EU 
itself has described the relationship as being akin to turf warfare. We can take 
this position further when we consider the role of the US, especially in the 
early years. The US was an identity both within the body and without; this 
identity held major sway over the direction of the body in the post-war years 
and this dominance can still be felt today. This ‘inside-outside’ personality has 
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been able to influence numerous other identities within the body to act in 
accordance with its desires, while at the same time being able to anger and 
divide those identities within the body who disagree with its vision. 
The second aspect of Multiple Personality Disorder, “alternately take control 
of …an individual” is once again manifested in the conflict between the UK, 
France and the US. No other identity within Europe has been able to direct the 
body as much as these identities have; it must be stressed here that while other 
personalities within the body do have marginal power, the power which the 
UK, France and the US wield cannot be underestimated. These power plays 
for control of the body have been extensively explored in this thesis; we see 
that the French identity has viewed NATO as a place where the other identity, 
Britain, in conjunction with the foreign entity, the US, plan and scheme for 
dominance of the European body. We have also seen how the French identity 
planned to unite the smaller identities to follow its own vision for the body; in 
this way we have witnessed these two powerful identities struggle for power 
while the ‘inside-outside’ entity attempted to influence the outcome. 
The final aspect of the disorder, “The person also experiences memory loss 
that is too extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness” can be 
witnessed in the continued declarations made by the body. The EU continues 
to make bold assertions concerning its role in the world, while forgetting that it 
has made these same bold assertions in the past without ever following 
through. This memory loss extends to each of the multiple identities within the 
body; these identities, when they join together in collective discussion at the 
Parliament, or at the body’s ‘mind’ if you will, boldly claim that they will not 
cut defence spending and any defence spending that is cut will be made in a 
structured format along with all the other co-dependent identities. However 
outside the Parliament, these same identities seem to forget these promises 
year on year, and continue to make cuts in an uncoordinated manner. This 
forgetfulness is not just limited to discussions within the European body; these 
same identities make the same promises in NATO and once again they forget 
or they choose to ignore these promises and the dysfunctional and debilitating 
cycle continues on.  
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This summative analysis has now conclusively examined the data that has 
been collected; we turn now to concisely answering the thesis question, “Can 
the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the 
Member States’ militaries’?  
CONCLUSION: 
To answer this question let us briefly review each section.  
Section One: the primary focus of this section was to put any potential military 
integration into the context of what is happening globally. As was outlined, 
military integration does not occur in a vacuum; therefore, this section 
provided a framework in which to contextualise the strategies and policies 
pursued by the EU towards military integration. To clarify, while Section One 
does not directly answer the question, it is fundamental to that answer. The 
complex nature of the conflicts, their potential to impact the world economy, 
and their volatility all combine to present the West, and for our interest the 
EU, with as yet unfathomable perplexities. These unfathomable perplexities 
suggest that within current constraints, European military integration would 
not lead to European credibility in the contemporary security environment. 
Section Two: The second section provides us with a depth of insight into the 
thesis topic. Throughout this section, we explored the various NATO strategies 
and summits; alongside this, we examined a number of NATO member states 
militaries, both European and American; and finally, we analysed how NATO 
members conducted themselves in Libya. This section provided a clear 
example of how an already existing European military alliance conducted 
itself in recent times and how European members within this alliance acted in 
accordance with the requirements of this organisation. It became clear that 
with few exceptions the European members did not take their role within 
NATO seriously and in fact had a long and clearly provable history of ongoing 
defence cuts which resulted in not only falling below the required threshold of 
GDP spending, but also in failing to be able to act without American 
leadership. Throughout this section, we witnessed inter-member conflict to the 
extent that the French were absent from the alliance for the majority of 
NATO’s existence; we also saw that other nations were more than happy to sit 
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behind a wall of American and British troops during the Cold War. This reality 
led to resentment from all sides towards one another and thus growing distrust 
amongst the members.  
Section Two also highlighted how decades of uncoordinated defence cuts have 
led to the inability of large numbers of the alliance members being unable to 
conduct themselves in a credible manner within Europe’s immediate sphere of 
influence; as stated several times, without American leadership and weapons 
platforms and ammunition in Libya, the greatest military alliance in history 
would have been unable to overthrow a third world dictator right on its 
doorstep. Even with American leadership and support, the alliance was shown 
to be severely fragmented in terms of power and ability. Despite the clear 
shortfalls of the European members during this campaign, the same members 
continued to cut their defence spending. This combination of factors leaves 
many to wonder if Libya was to be replayed today, how many European 
nations would even show up?  
In regards to the thesis question, what does Section Two tell us about whether 
the EU can be a credible security actor without integration? Section Two 
clearly shows us that Europe, as it stands, is incapable of acting in a credible 
manner with integration; this is due to the considerable gap between Member 
States’ defence abilities, intentions, internal pressures and ambitions. 
Therefore in light of the question ‘can the EU can act on the international 
stage’, we conclude that it could not act as a unified body under current 
circumstances and within present constraints. However, it is entirely 
reasonable to expect the UK or France to be able and willing to act either 
independently or in conjunction with other Member States. This however 
could not be considered to constitute an official EU action, despite the fact that 
it would be highly reasonable that any such mission would receive the EU’s 
blessing. In addition, individual actions undertaken or led by the UK or France 
could in no way be construed as an integrated European military force. 
How then does Section Three influence this thesis question? Section Three 
explored various ways in which the EU and its predecessors attempted to 
construct a truly independent European military. From the post-war Pleven 
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Plan to the current Lisbon Treaty, we see that in terms of linguistic resources 
the EU has given this issue much attention. Despite this considerable attention, 
the fact remains that the EU has yet to integrate its member’s militaries. The 
EU has put to paper numerous policy announcements such as the Battle Group 
strategy and yet these still remain in the theoretical. Institutions such as the 
CSDP have, in theory, made steps towards this goal but once again we see that 
disagreements amongst Member States and other European institutions have 
effectively hamstrung any attempts to create a credible integrated military. The 
inter-fighting amongst Member States and European Institutions has reached 
such a crescendo that in 2013, the European Parliament described the 
relationship as a “turf war”. 
This turf war has been evident throughout the thesis, and led to the conclusion 
that the EU is suffering from Multiple Personality Disorder. The fact that it 
can be readily demonstrated that the EU is clearly suffering from this disorder 
brings into serious question the ability of the EU to act as an integrated, 
credible security actor. Throughout this thesis, there has existed only one actor 
which has consistently been in a leadership position regarding European 
defence, the United States. The fact that a non-European nation has played, 
and continues to play, such a prominent role in European defence for so many 
decades is, in and of itself, is a cogent example of Europe’s inability to act in a 
unified and credible manner independent of the US. It must be reiterated here 
that even with American leadership Europe has been incapable of acting 
credibly because of its internal disputes, lack of resources and policies which 
remain unimplemented. 
With this information in mind, the question must be asked “can the EU be a 
credible international security actor without the integration of the Member 
States’ militaries?” The answer to this question is ‘no’; it is ‘no’, but with the 
caveat that that this does not mean that independent EU Member States cannot 
be credible on the international stage – but that is not our question. The UK 
and France have both demonstrated the ability to act in a credible manner on 
the international stage independently of the EU, but this reality bears us no 
closer to answering the question.  
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So we ask the question from a different perspective, if the EU were to integrate 
its members’ militaries tomorrow would it be credible? Again the answer 
would almost certainly be ‘no’; there is no clear, defined and believable 
strategy for present and future military integration; members are in a self-
described turf war with one another and there is no overall established or 
proven European command for this integrated force. Under current conditions, 
and within today’s constraints, an integrated military would simply be a 
shambles and could be predicted to implode shortly after its first deployment 
due to political infighting in Brussels, inadequate resourcing, and internal 
turmoil.       
The fact remains that the EU has possessed a platform upon which to 
formulate a credible integrated military through the Battlegroup strategy for 
many years, and yet has been incapable of doing so. This reality clearly 
demonstrates that with or without military integration one cannot, at this 
juncture, view the EU as a credible security actor.  
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